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Flipping a coin to decide a case is among the most serious forms of judicial
misconduct, and yet judges react quite differently to other types of lotteries. Judges tend to
tolerate or encourage deliberately random decisions in nonjudicial settings ranging from
military drafts to experimental welfare requirements. Equally striking, most adjudicators
now embrace randomization within their own institutions: they commonly use lotteries to
assign incoming cases to each other. This practice creates a remarkable tension. Because
adjudicators vary in competence and ideology, randomizing their case assignments will
effectively randomize outcomes in a subset of merits decisions. We might then ask whether
the typical adjudicative system is sometimes at war with itself, condemning courtroom coin
flips while operating backroom lotteries with similar effects.
This Article attempts to accept and defend tension in the judicial treatment of
randomized decisions. The Article begins by investigating the concept of randomization and
the leading justifications for randomizing social decisions. It then offers a consequentialist
defense for the pattern of judicial reactions to official lotteries. This defense admits that
case-assignment lotteries have merits-randomizing effects, and it accepts that a meritsrandomization ban might be the best rule for fallible judges facing public relations
problems. Even so, random case assignment can be justified based on three consequences,
aside from the convenience of judges: (1) fairly allocating to litigants the tragically scarce
and indivisible resource of judicial excellence, (2) roughly honoring the politics of the
judicial appointments process, and (3) continuing a natural experiment on the determinants
of judicial behavior. These arguments cannot explain why adjudicative institutions
developed as they did. But they can exploit various social benefits that the system has
produced, in a sense, randomly.
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INTRODUCTION
A perceived divide between randomization and justice is centuries old in the Western
world. Both the Goddess of Fortune and the Goddess of Justice have been depicted as
blindfolded, but Justitia holds a scale while Fortuna scatters her rewards without any such
guide.1 The cultural situation is not radically different today. In the United States, the
favored icon for justice remains the same: a decision maker veiled from irrelevant facts and
attuned to law rather than whim or chance.
Randomization has a poor reputation in judicial rhetoric as well. As early as 1811 an
American judge wrote that “[t]he decision of a contested case by lot or chance must be
reprobated by every honest man.”2 More recently, judges have sanctioned other judges for
flipping coins to resolve disputes, intimated that executive discretion should not extend to
decision by lot, and invalidated an entire system of capital punishment for resembling
random lightning strikes.3 Although rolling dice may entertain or guide individuals in their
personal lives,4 it might be considered inconsistent with the rudiments of a just government.
Despite these first impressions, judicial opposition to randomization turns out to be
modest. It is nearly impossible to locate a case invalidating an official decision because it
was deliberately randomized. True, pervasive randomization would often bump into
generally accepted judicial commitments; flipping coins to determine guilt in every criminal
case is incompatible with a commitment to judgments based on legally relevant evidence.
But such incidental conflicts do not entail judicial opposition to randomization per se. In
fact, courts might be as likely to order randomization as to forbid it. Apparently no one even
asked a judge to condemn the 1969 Vietnam military draft lottery for relying on
randomization—but this lottery actually was challenged for being not random enough, and a
federal judge took the complaint quite seriously.5
Is it possible to distinguish situations in which courts are likely to resist
randomization (for example, capital sentencing) from those in which they are likely to be
indifferent or even promote it (for example, military drafts)? High stakes cannot be the
distinguishing feature; randomization is sometimes tolerated in matters of life and death. A
far better predictor, I will argue, is institutional location. Although relevant cases are few,
judicial opposition to randomization looks parochial. Judges strongly condemn
1. See Lorraine Daston, Life, Chance & Life Chances, DÆDALUS, Winter 2008, at 6 (“Fortuna is a powerful
goddess, but it is Justitia who commands the moral high ground.”).
2. Lessee of Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 150, 153 (Pa. 1811) (Yeates, J.) (discussing verdicts, but concluding
juror testimony should not be admissible to prove lot-drawing).
3. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
4. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVY, THE PERFECT THING: HOW THE IPOD SHUFFLES COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND
COOLNESS 227–54 (2006) (discussing randomization and shuffle play on the iPod); GERDA REITH, THE AGE OF
CHANCE: GAMBLING IN WESTERN CULTURE 127–55 (1999) (discussing gambling as, in part, thrill-seeking
through uncertainty and its resolution); cf. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 1940) (reporting
that the petitioner flipped a coin to decide whether to plead nolo contendere).
5. See Stodolsky v. Hershey, 2 Selective Serv. L. Rptr. 3527, 3528–29 (W.D. Wis. 1969); infra Part II.B.2
(examining Stodolsky and examples of court support for randomization).
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randomization for their own merits decisions to the point of imposing professional sanctions,
yet judges are likely to retreat when other officials consciously randomize. If this is the
pattern, then judicial opposition to randomization is restricted to self-regulation.
The question is whether judges are right to expel randomization from their merits
decisions and not elsewhere. A defense of this pattern has become more challenging because,
in an important respect, adjudication is now shot through with randomization. The decision
makers themselves—judges and jurors—are typically assigned their cases through lotteries.
Random case assignment takes place hundreds of thousands of times every year in courts
across the country, and many administrative agencies follow suit.6 Only later stages of
adjudication provoke allergies to randomization. But because the pool of decision makers
differs in competence and ideology, random case assignment will influence an untold
number of case outcomes.7 The greater the diversity across decision makers, the greater the
likely influence of a case assignment lottery. This is true even if the system is dead-set
against overtly randomizing merits decisions. In the least charitable terms, then, courts have
come to exemplify what they so loudly condemn.
Can we defend an adjudicative system that habitually randomizes its decision makers
but never their decisions?8 The question is worth asking because we can imagine a system
closer to the opposite of the status quo. Cases could be assigned to judges based on their
perceived expertise, or the combined preferences of the litigants,9 and these non-random
assignment systems could be accompanied by a modest domain of merits decisions that are
concluded by lot. If there is a convincing defense of the current arrangement, moreover, it
6. See infra Part II.C (describing some case assignment systems, the murky history of their development, and
the limits on randomization within these systems).
7. See infra Part III.A (discussing the interaction of “ideology,” “competence,” assignment systems, and case
outcomes).
8. For recognition of the combination without much defense, see NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON
LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 74–75 (1999) (discussing litigant acceptance of jury selection). For a
brief argument in favor of “neutral” case assignment, standing alone, see J. Robert Brown & Allison Herren
Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1040–41 & n.16, 1066–69
(2000) (arguing that a neutral assignment system restrains judges from deliberately influencing outcomes via
assignment) and Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 WIS.
L. REV. 461, 481–82 (discussing advantages of dialogue within a court system). For the thought that random
assignment, unlike randomization on the merits, preserves “the opportunity to persuade a rational arbiter” in
controversial cases, see John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 110 (1987). Coons’s article is an
extended meditation on the value of consistency in law. More specifically, he identifies and evaluates legal
rules that seem to authorize inconsistent remedies across similar cases, see id. at 76–92, and he offers
justifications for “inconsistency-by-rule” based on the virtues of decentralized decision making, participation,
and viewpoint diversity on contested issues, see id. at 109–13. His article is thought-provoking, but his focus
was neither randomization nor the relationship between random case assignment and merits judgments.
9. See, e.g., MAUREEN SOLOMON & DOUGLAS K. SOMERLOT, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT:
NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE 8, 13, 28–29 (1973) (describing older assignment systems with discretionary
judgments by the chief judge); Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 291, 298, 310 (2000) (advocating the assignment of appellate judge panels partly by the rankorder preferences of the parties to a case); see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for
Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216, 233 (1999) (suggesting balancing of federal circuit
court panels by an ideological proxy).
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should rest on more than judges’ preferences. Random case assignment ignores important
differences among judges, while refusing to randomize merits decisions encourages the
proliferation of other contestable tiebreakers.10
My defense of the system’s design comes in several steps. As to the ban on
randomizing merits decisions, it is the only acceptable flat rule for when to randomize and, I
will suggest, a flexible standard is problematic. This conclusion is not firm but it draws on a
reasonable view of imperfect judges and their public relations challenges. Opposing merits
randomization, however, only complicates the argument for assignment randomization. One
response is to cut the tension by claiming that randomizing judges does not count as
randomizing merits decisions, whatever the effect on outcomes. But there are other defenses.
First, we should view the assignment process as matching judges to litigants, not only cases
to judges. This outsider perspective can accept randomization as a fair method for allocating
a scarce and indivisible resource: judicial excellence. Second, we should expand our frame
of analysis further to consider the appointments process. The larger system of matching
judges to litigants includes the random assignment process now popular with judges as well
as the appointments process that gave them their offices. Randomizing at the assignment
stage can rightly bow to decisions at the appointments stage regarding the proper mix of
adjudicators. Third, random assignment creates a natural experiment. Trustworthy empirical
study may depend on such lotteries for insight into judicial behavior. Indeed, these studies
are one way to better learn how judges are different and, therefore, how the judge assignment
system can drive case outcomes.
Part I is largely theoretical and continues modern efforts to demystify randomization.
The discussion highlights several overlapping justifications for lotteries and examples of
their use in social decisions. Part II sorts out the judicial position on randomization. Judicial
skepticism of randomization in other institutions is difficult to find, and judges regularly
adopt modified lotteries to assign cases among themselves. Yet judges almost never overtly
randomize their merits decisions, and those who do risk sanctions beyond reversal. Part III
offers a functional defense for this pattern.11 The analysis in this Part accepts that
randomizing decision makers effectively randomizes outcomes for a class of cases, and it
admits that the affected class does not match the ideal domain for merits randomization
indicated by abstract normative theory. But the system can be defended by stressing the
institutional setting and practical realities of adjudication. A merits randomization ban might
well be the best approach for fallible judges and, in any event, assignment randomization
probably amounts to a sensible lottery of judges given the competing claims of litigants, the

10. See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text (collecting tiebreakers).
11. I mean a normative defense based on the beneficial consequences of an arrangement—not a positive
explanation of behavior that works backward from beneficial consequences. See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 14 (2007) (discussing the latter).
Establishing the normative defense will be difficult enough without proceeding to establish that any net social
benefit was the actual reason for the arrangement’s establishment.
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character of the appointments process, our desire for information on judicial behavior, and
the feasible alternatives. This defense does not track the actual motives of the system’s
designers, who were likely driven by other forces. But the rest of us can appreciate the social
benefits that the system has produced, in a sense, randomly.
I. UNDERSTANDING RANDOMIZATION
Our concern is randomization in decisions that affect third parties. This indicates a
structure of interest: decision makers using procedures to generate outcomes that affect a
pool of subjects. It should be emphasized just how many decisions must be made for this
structure to function. Among other choices, the decision makers must be given positions of
power, the pool of affected subjects must be determined, and a decision rule must be
selected. The last point deserves emphasis. Randomization might be adopted as a decision
rule for good reasons, for bad reasons, or for no discernible reason, but randomization in this
context is always the outcome of a prior decision-making process. The task is to understand
when this anterior process should select randomization—that is, when decision makers
should decide to decide by randomization.
A. Three Concepts of Randomization
Before addressing that normative question, we should be clear on which version of
randomization is worth analyzing. Sometimes the term “random” is used to refer to ideas not
central to the inquiry here, such as the absence of a detectible purpose or pattern. Sometimes
terms like “arbitrary” refer to ideas within the heartland of our concern.
An initial distinction lies between processes and outcomes. Either can be
characterized as random.12 We can describe the process of rolling an unweighted die as
“random” without commenting on the pattern of numbers that come up, just as we can
describe certain numerical sequences as more random than others without saying anything
about the process for generating them.13 Because our focus is decision-making protocols,
process-oriented concepts are most pertinent. Certainly these processes will be evaluated
with reference to their consequences,14 but the topic of ultimate concern will remain the
decision-making processes designed to generate results randomly.
Within the domain of processes, however, randomization can have more than one
meaning. Two leading academic concepts of process randomization are statistical and
epistemic.15 A statistically random process is probably the more intuitive concept. It refers to
12. See DEBORAH J. BENNETT, RANDOMNESS 165–67 (1998); JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS:
STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 40–41 (1989) [hereinafter ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS].
13. The sequence 01001111 is more “random” in this sense than is 11111111, regardless of the process by
which these numbers were selected for inclusion in this sentence. See GREGORY J. CHAITIN, EXPLORING
RANDOMNESS 111 (2001).
14. Cf. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 169–73 (describing tests for random processes that are based on outcome
distributions).
15. See David Wasserman, Let Them Eat Chances: Probability and Distributive Justice, 12 ECON. & PHIL.
29, 30 (1996); cf. IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS
ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION, AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE 12–13 (1975) (exploring probability theory as
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a process that affords equal probability to all outcomes within a given set.16 The set of
possible outcomes must be chosen somehow,17 but, once specified, any member of the
outcome set must be equally likely to occur when the process is used. This notion of
randomization is commonplace, even if the resulting distributions do not fit common
expectations for “randomness.”18 There is also the familiar idea of a weighted lottery, which
is a variation on statistical randomization.19 It is a compromise process intermediate between
equal chances and other decision rules, such as merit or market allocations.
Statistical randomization, however intuitive, might be purely theoretical. Innovators
have been striving for decades to create devices that are demonstrably random in a statistical
sense.20 Dice can be engineered only so well, and approaching statistical randomness will
always depend on the procedure for rolling them. Computer-administered algorithms
generate numbers with incredible efficiency, but they depend on a seed to get them started. If
the seed is not appropriately selected, statistical randomness can be compromised.21 In fact,
perfect statistical randomization might not even be theoretically possible. Perhaps adequate
information before a randomizing process finishes would invariably preclude the assurance
of equal probabilities. Enough knowledge about physics and the manner in which a die is
rolled should enable an observer to calculate odds different from one in six.22 To be sure,
many randomization devices are good enough for their assigned purposes in light of limited
observer information. The role of ignorance in preserving equal probability assumptions
does, however, lead to a distinct concept.

related to distributions from chance processes and degrees of uncertainty).
16. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 155; Stephen E. Feinberg, Randomization and Social Affairs: The 1970
Draft Lottery, SCIENCE, Jan. 22, 1971, at 255, 258 (describing the statistician’s idea of an ideally random
process).
17. This point will become crucial in the analysis below. See infra Part III.A.2–C (assessing random case
assignment).
18. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM FELLER, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 161
(1967) (“[T]o the untrained eye randomness appears as a regularity or tendency to cluster.”); Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 32, 36–37 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982) (similar).
19. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 113–14; Douglas C. Wilms, Georgia’s Land
Lottery of 1832, 52 CHRONICLES OF OKLA. 52, 54 (1974) (describing a lottery that doubled the chances for
veterans, orphans, family heads, and others to win acquired Indian land). For a scheme weighted as to one class
yet unweighted as to another, see Akhil Reed Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 193, 195 (exploring election of representatives from single member districts by randomly selecting a
ballot cast by a voter in each district).
20. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 132–51; see also Feinberg, supra note 16, at 258 (calling perfect
independence and equal probability “impossible”).
21. See, e.g., JONATHAN KNUDSEN, JAVA CRYPTOGRAPHY 22–24 (1998). A web service advertising “true
random numbers” based on seeds from atmospheric noise is available at http://www.random.org.
22. Cf. XITAO FAN ET AL., SAS FOR MONTE CARLO STUDIES: A GUIDE FOR QUANTITATIVE RESEARCHERS 25
(2002) (asserting that “no events in nature are truly random”). There is an odd relationship here to ancient
refusals to accept the existence of chance, when doing so threatened a powerful view of divine will or divine
planning. See REITH, supra note 4, at 13–15 (discussing shifts in acceptance over time).
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An epistemically random process generates outcomes that are equally probable as far
as an observer can tell.23 This happens whenever a person is sufficiently ignorant such that it
becomes attractive for her or him to assign equal probabilities to a set of possible outcomes,
regardless of what omniscience would reveal. This estimation is most understandable when a
process appears designed to approximate statistical randomization, as with an apparently
unweighted die rolled fairly, but epistemic randomness reaches further. Think about an
observer who is accurately informed that a die is loaded but not told how. “For all he knows,
no number is more likely than any other to come up,”24 even though the device is certainly
not statistically random in any objective sense. A real world example is the New York City
subway search program, which attempts to maintain only “the veneer of random
deployment.”25 The epistemic concept is thus subjective and allows randomness to vary
across observers.
To be a useful concept, however, epistemic randomness seems to rely on a
tendentious model of ideal rationality or actual human behavior. Something like the principle
of insufficient reason would have to be accepted, whereby an observer should or will assume
equiprobability across specified outcomes despite uncertainty on just that point.26 It is not
clear that people assume equal probabilities even when a process appears well designed to
produce them.27 In any event, epistemic randomness captures a useful thought by
underscoring the role of uncertainty in efforts at statistical randomization. It also suggests
that “randomness” might be all around us rather than hopelessly out of reach. Given the
difficulties of prediction in a complex world, perhaps epistemic randomness is pervasive.
There is a third concept worth mentioning. Use of a decision rule might be
considered randomization if the rule is unrelated to any normatively sound basis for
decision.28 Such decision processes can be called orthogonally random. True, some decision
rules are considered both unrelated to a proper view of the merits and normatively
prohibited, like choosing the outcome that will maximize harm to race minorities. But other
grounds for decision have no such taint. An example familiar to legal scholars is the
convention of listing contributing colleagues’ names alphabetically in the star footnote,
which is a decision rule thought utterly uncorrelated with merit.29 The subway search
23. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 154; ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 43.
24. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 43.
25. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the difference between the intended
appearance and the actual basis for choosing subway checkpoints).
26. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 43.
27. See, e.g., REITH, supra note 4, at 175 (discussing gamblers).
28. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 SOC. SCI. INFO. 483, 479–80 (1988)
(arguing that a lottery may be fair if “impersonal” in this sense); see also David Heyd, When Practical Reason
Plays Dice, in REASONING PRACTICALLY 58, 62 (Edna Ullmann-Margalit ed., 2000) (discussing mechanisms
“not known to be correlated in any way to the issue at hand”). I would add to Heyd’s discussion that a process
can be meaningfully “random” when the decision rule is known not to correlate with any normative basis for
decision.
29. Like statistical randomization, this ordering delivers no information about the quality of comments
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program provides a more serious illustration: police officers are instructed to search the bags
of every nth passenger who passes the checkpoint.30
Orthogonal randomization is a spin-off of epistemic randomness, assuming the
decision maker had no reason to believe that any identifiable pool member was more likely
to receive the benefit when the decision rule was chosen. The process can also be seen as a
convenient substitute for statistical randomization, insofar as the decision rule is intended to
mindlessly allocate resources without advantage purposefully given to any outcome in the
set. Rules truly detached from normative considerations might be more difficult to identify
and administer than are pseudo-random number generators, but both can be grouped
together.
None of these three concepts is a priori superior. They are significant for different
purposes, and concentrating on one will spotlight some normative questions to the exclusion
of others. For example, thinking about statistical randomization prompts consideration of the
circumstances in which decision makers should deliberately make outcomes equally
probable, despite numerous alternatives. In contrast, the existence of epistemic randomness
can present transparency issues regarding the propriety of keeping one class of people
ignorant of the operative decision rule. Those questions are the same as asking when and
what kinds of substitutes are appropriate for statistical randomization. These issues are
suggested by the possibility of orthogonal randomization.
All three concepts will be touched on below. But to simplify matters, the focus will
be on attempts at statistical randomization with a secondary concern for orthogonal
randomization. A decision maker’s attempt to assure equal probabilities will be sufficient to
attract our attention—understanding that literal equiprobability might be impossible, that
lack of relevant information might be required, and that orthogonal randomization might be
an acceptable substitute. Although much of the analysis will apply to epistemic randomness,
the issues surrounding deliberate statistical and orthogonal randomization are important
enough and can be more cleanly analyzed on their own.
B. Randomization’s Features and Justifications
People have turned to deliberate randomization in various situations and for
thousands of years.31 Randomization has been used to drive shuffle play on iPods,32 to
enhance digital audio processing,33 to initiate sporting contests34 and presidential debates,35
provided, but breaking the alphabetizing convention requires an explanation to avert confusion, and in this
Article I have followed the convention. For an instance of co-authors statistically randomizing the order of their
names, perhaps to equalize the chance of recognition in short citation form regardless of entrenched alphabetical
advantage, see Jan B. Heide et al., Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice,
41 J.L. & ECON. 387, 387 n.* (1998) (stating that “all contributed equally to the article”).
30. See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 265 (noting the number is specified by a supervisor).
31. See BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11–12, 17–44 (describing ancient gaming and divination); DUXBURY,
supra note 8, at 43–84 (collecting examples involving social choice).
32. See LEVY, supra note 4, at 177–204 (regarding the initial version of shuffle play).
33. See JOHN WATKINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL AUDIO 120–22 (2002) (regarding the dithering

9

to order candidate names on ballots,35 to resolve election ties35 and more casual
disagreements,36 to create samples for opinion polling,37 to measure the unemployment
rate,38 to make clinical drug trials more reliable,39 to pick out travelers for extra law
enforcement screening,40 to promote electronic security through cryptography,41 and to
allocate housing vouchers,42 charter school slots,43 immigration visas,43 and the burden of
military service.44 Yet pervasive statistical randomization would be calamitous; it would
yield indefensible rewards and punishments, destabilize patterns of behavior, and kill
socially valuable incentives. Imagine systematic randomization of the decisions whether to
provide a benefit like health insurance, the scope of the benefit, and the recipient class. The
results would be unjustifiable.
Randomization has many alternatives, of course. Among them are (1) judgment
based on perceptions of merit, need, or desert and the related option of delegation to experts;
(2) politics, including collective deliberation and the aggregation of judgments by voting
rules; (3) markets, which translate demand and ability to pay into resource allocations; (4)
equal shares, whether by physical partition or temporal rotation; and (5) first-in-time rules,
which often reward knowledge, speed, and desire unrelated to wealth.45 Intelligent selection
process).
34. See INTERNATIONAL TENNIS FEDERATION, RULES OF TENNIS 6 (2009) (prescribing a coin toss to allocate
the power to choose serving order); 2003-2004 OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
168 (Larry Upson ed., 2003) (similar).
35. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 105.051(1)(c); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 5.01(4)(a); Randal C. Archibold, Election
at a Draw, Arizona Town Cuts a Deck, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2009.
35. See Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Randomization Inference With Natural Experiments: An Analysis of
Ballot Effects in the 2003 California Recall Election, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 888, 889 (2006).
35. See The First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008 (transcript), available at
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/debates/transcripts/first-presidential-debate.html.
36. See DOUGLAS WALKER & GRAHAM WALKER, THE OFFICIAL ROCK PAPER SCISSORS STRATEGY GUIDE 61–
73 (2004) (treating the game as one of skill). I consider Rock–Paper–Scissors an orthogonal randomization
device, at least when only one round is played by amateurs.
37. See THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2005, at 378–79 (Alec Gallup & Frank Newport eds., 2006)
(investigating public opinion on sampling by sampling public opinion).
38. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY: CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 34 to 3-13 (2006) (Technical Paper 66) (describing stratified random sampling).
39. See HENRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1900-1990, at 132–63 (1997).
40. See United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 615–16, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding random selection of
airline passengers for handheld magnetometer scanning).
41. See KNUDSON, supra note 21.
42. See Sara Olkon, Many Seek Section 8 Help: CHA Holding Lottery for Waiting List Spots, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
17, 2008.
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (regarding allocation of certain excess visas to “diversity immigrants”).
43. See 20 U.S.C. § 7225d(b) (2006) (regarding oversubscribed charter schools receiving grants); see also
Peter Stone, What Can Lotteries Do for Education?, 6 TH. & RES. IN ED. 267, 268 (2008) (collecting examples
of school admissions lotteries).
44. See infra text accompanying note 78 (discussing the 1969 military draft lottery).
45. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 18, 31–50 (1978) (investigating quantity and
allocation decisions, and comparing markets, political processes, custom, and “lotteries” defined to include both
equal chances and equal payouts); ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 69–78 (comparing
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of randomization over these alternatives requires a decision maker to pinpoint
randomization’s peculiar features.
In so doing, it should be understood that randomization is fully compatible with
modernist rationality. Twentieth-century modernists made room for randomization by better
specifying the concept, incorporating it into theories of rational choice, and harnessing it to
make experiments more reliable. Randomization need not involve a belief in divine will
revealed by lot,46 nor does it bypass the issue of how to make contested decisions.
Randomization is one decision strategy among many,47 and although there might not be an
uncontested boundary to its optimal domain, there is an emerging group of rational
justifications for resort to lots.
1. Equal Opportunity and Other Features
As a decision rule, randomization has one particularly special feature: it represents a
certain version of equal opportunity.48 Statistically random processes guarantee an equal
chance of yielding any outcome within a predetermined outcome set. The connection to
equal opportunity is probably most apparent when the possible outcomes are associated with
individual persons, as with a lottery for a benefit in which each pool member receives one
ticket.
This is only one version of equal opportunity, however, and not necessarily the most
compelling. Other versions bracket a limited number of characteristics, such as race or sex,
while allowing pool members to compete on other grounds. Statistical randomization is
different. It aims to equalize chances across the board and prevents distinctions based on
skills, endowments, desire, or anything else. In addition, only chances are equalized, not
necessarily outcomes. Giving each of 100 pool members a 1 percent chance of receiving a
benefit is obviously not the same as giving each of them 1 percent of the benefit. Statistical
randomization thus makes outcomes less predictable than equal shares, and it is therefore not
only a profound leveler of individual difference but also a source of unsettling drama. The
next section describes occasions when granting equal chances is nevertheless desirable. For
now, it is enough to recognize this feature as a source of difference for randomization.
Randomization has other notable features, but they turn out to be less unique.
Theorists tend to stress that randomization can (1) cut decision costs,49 (2) tie the hands of

lotteries to absolute equality, queuing, rotation, need, productivity, contribution, desert, and auctions).
46. See, e.g., Joshua 7:11–22 (King James) (involving the identification of Achan the thief); Proverbs 16:33
(“The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the LORD.”).
47. For a distinct claim that dedication to critical reason mandates randomization in situations of uncertainty
involving human behavior and punishment policy, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on
Punishment: On the Limits of Reason and the Virtues of Randomization, 40 SOC. RES. 307, 328–34 (2007).
48. See, e.g., BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 39–40 (1992) (stressing an equalization role for
lotteries); Hank Greely, Comment, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 113, 122,
141 (1977) (similar).
49. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 54.
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decision makers,50 and (3) dampen behavioral incentives all around, if compared to decisions
based on merit, willingness to pay, and so forth.51 Lotteries indeed can be run quickly with
modest expenditures—although high costs can arise from deciding whether to randomize,
which outcomes to randomize, and how to safeguard the randomization process from
corruption. It is also true that honestly conducted lotteries place results beyond anyone’s
influence, including error-prone decision makers, and therefore lotteries might reduce
incentives to curry or solicit favor. But many rules52 share these qualities. Consider “equal
shares for everyone” and “oldest people win.”53 These, too, are easily administered flat rules
that leave little room for personal influence when honestly executed. Because randomization
is a semi-exotic practice in official decisions, perhaps it is easy to forget that it is simply one
of many possible rules.54
That said, randomization does have a peculiar relationship to uncertainty. Inflexible
rules tend to be allied with predictability and planning, even if they do not always match up
in practice. Lotteries are distinct. Statistical randomization assures that no potential outcome
is more likely than any other, meaning that observers can, at best, plan for equal chances.
Whether imperfect predictability is undesirable depends on the needs of decision makers.
Either way, it helps set randomization apart. Thus randomization’s distinctiveness does not
come from its rule-like character, but rather from a combination of features that starts where
we began: a principle of equal opportunity, joined with a hard-line rule of decision and a
notable degree of unpredictability.
2. Overlapping Justifications
Although randomization has been around for many centuries, there seems to be no
precise and concise restatement of when it is normatively superior to alternative decision
strategies. This might be the consequence of its relatively rare use in significant social
decisions, or it could be that an easily executed restatement is not possible. Ultimately, the
superiority of randomization depends on a normative orientation and factual premises over
which people will disagree, along with a contestable review of the feasible alternatives.
Instead of fabricating a universal prescription, we can gather arguments that are appealing
from several perspectives.
50. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 45, at 44; DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 51–53.
51. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 56; ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 109–13. The
comparative baseline of merits decisions might be implicit in these writings, which make the point about
dampening incentives. But it should be stressed that randomization can instead preserve incentives, at least for
lottery pool members, when compared to a different baseline. See infra text accompanying note 69.
52. See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257 (1974) (distinguishing specific rules from flexible standards); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–63, 586–96 (1992) (adding the dimension of
complexity/simplicity).
53. Not all of these alternative rules can be described as orthogonally random. Some of them will aim to
approximate normatively defensible grounds for decision.
54. See, e.g., John Broome, Selecting People Randomly, 95 ETHICS 38, 41–42 (1984) (recognizing decision
cost considerations in favor of lotteries, but rightly noting cheap alternatives).
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Two reasons for randomizing will nonetheless be set aside: divination and aesthetics.
This is not to downplay the influence of either; they have motivated randomization for an
impressively long time. But divination is foreclosed under the type of modernist rationality
by which this Article intends to abide. It might be possible for a modernist to recommend
randomization because others will believe the outcomes reveal divine will, but not because
she believes this to be true. The reason for bracketing aesthetics is different. There is nothing
nonrational about choosing randomization because it produces drama and mystery, or
because it feels appropriately humble in challenging decision situations. Yet such intuitions
can be reinforced with arguments that do not depend on a particular aesthetic sensibility or
thrill-seeking decision makers.
Three overlapping justifications for randomization then stand out. The first involves
equally strong claims to some outcome. Claims might seem equally strong because of an
egalitarian commitment or because of irreducible uncertainty. Either way, randomization
becomes plausible at least if the resource in question is indivisible. A second justification is
less connected to any particular normative vision and is more of a pragmatic concession to
brute fact. It invokes lotteries as the least-bad option when behavior might otherwise be
socially destructive. A third justification is informational or experimental. Random sampling
and random interventions offer the possibility of eliminating uncertainty for the future. These
arguments are sometimes set apart from others,55 but the popularity of natural experiments
today makes any such division artificial.
a. Equal Claims and Indivisibility
Because randomization represents a form of equal opportunity, it can be a logical
response from decision makers confronted with equally plausible courses of action.56 More
than one factor influences whether a decision maker views a set of choices as equally
justified. Among them is a commitment to some version of egalitarian justice that aims to
afford people equal dignity and respect. Even with full information, egalitarians can be
attracted to randomization as a method for providing people respect in the form of equal
chances to enjoy a benefit or to avoid a burden.57 Barbara Goodwin pushes far in this
direction. She considers a “Total Social Lottery” to better mix life chances when scarcity and
structured inequality thwart that goal.58 We can conclude that the proper domain for
differentiating merits judgments is much larger, and the domain for randomization far
55. Duxbury and Elster do mention randomized trials in discussing the control of decision-maker bias, but it
is not a theme for either of them. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 100–02; ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS,
supra note 12, at 53–54; cf. Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 552–53
(2008) (examining briefly the option of randomized policy intervention in an extended argument for policy
variation when decisions are reversible).
56. For a sophisticated contractarian defense of the lottery as an impartial method of distribution when
competing claims are equally strong, see Peter Stone, Why Lotteries Are Just, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 276 (2007).
57. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 285–89, 298 (1980); Greely,
supra note 48, at 141. To reiterate, an egalitarian randomizer still must choose the pool of outcomes using
indications of merit, need, and so on.
58. See GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 101–03.
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smaller, without overlooking the latter’s equalizing potential. Such moderation helps explain
limited lotteries for housing vouchers and charter school slots, but not for ordinary hiring
decisions.
If equality across some chosen set of people is ever a commitment, why prefer
merely equal chances to actually equal shares? Lotteries offer only the former along with
uncertainty in the interim. It turns out, however, that randomization is uniquely suited to the
goal of equalization for a class of decision situations. These situations involve indivisibility,
by which I mean that an item slated for allocation cannot be literally divided or cannot be
divided without an intolerable loss of value.59 Randomization allows each pool member to
obtain an equal chance of receiving a benefit even if the benefit cannot be partitioned.
Unwanted burdens can be viewed as the flipside of scarce benefits, and randomization
likewise spreads burdens without forcing each pool member to suffer.
A classic illustration is the overcrowded lifeboat. If more space cannot be constructed
and passengers cannot share the existing space without jeopardizing the well-being of
everyone, the passengers might justly draw lots to allocate limited seating.60 Although
passengers might use deliberation to ensure that some stay aboard, such as navigators who
can increase everyone’s probability of survival, they might allocate the remaining space by
lot so that “those having equal rights [are] put upon an equal footing.”61 There are other
possibilities, but few will suggest auctioning off the space. The analysis for subsidized
housing and public education is not much different for the egalitarian.
Another perspective from which to see equally strong claims requires no such
background commitment to treating people equally. It follows from twentieth century
theories of instrumentally rational choice. This might seem counterintuitive insofar as
randomization has been associated with mindlessness or frivolity, but rational choice
theorists understand randomization’s power to enhance one player’s strategic position with
respect to another62 and, more generally, to respond cheaply to situations of indifference and
uncertainty.63 “In the absence of reasons for choosing one alternative ... rather than another,”

59. See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 196 (1991) (characterizing
lotteries as providing “surrogate satisfaction” for equal claims to scarce indivisible goods); ELSTER, SOLOMONIC
JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 69–70. Scarcity indicates an allocation problem rather than a solution to it, so it
is not a helpful foundation for promoting randomization over other decision strategies.
60. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: A VICTORIAN YACHTING TRAGEDY
166–76 (1984) (describing suggestions that lots be drawn to select persons to be thrown overboard).
61. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (instructing a jury that
drawing lots “or some like way” guarantees equal rights and “guard[s] against partiality and oppression,
violence and conflict”). A different view is EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE
LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW 71 (1956) (calling for group death in the absence of an individual sacrifice by free
will).
62. See Eric Talley, Interdisciplinary Gap Filling: Game Theory and the Law, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1055,
1058, 1059 n.6 (1997) (reviewing DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994)) (describing
randomization strategies as one equilibrium in a noncooperative coordination game).
63. See Heyd, supra note 28, at 62, 66.
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Jon Elster writes, “we might as well select one at random.”64 This sense can arise naturally
for theorists who still believe that “[r]ationalism sees its chief triumph in the clear
recognition of the limits of actual insight.”65
More specifically, prescriptive theories for rational decisions can run out before they
identify a uniquely superior choice. One problem is decision maker indifference, even given
perfect information. Real cases of perfect equipoise might be rare, but lack of relevant
information is not. Key information can be too costly to be worth acquiring or impossible to
obtain, thereby inhibiting the prediction of payoffs or the estimation of probabilities. In
addition, a decision maker might be unable to rank his feasible options when they differ
along sufficiently different dimensions. Finally, the correct normative goal for decision
might be unsettled. Without knowing the appropriate objective, instrumental rationality
cannot function. Now, sometimes these decision situations can be avoided and sometimes
alternatives to randomization will seem at least equally attractive. But when a decision is
unavoidable, and particularly in cases of indivisibility, statistical randomization gains ground
when sound reasons for choosing run short.
b. Pragmatism and Incentives
This brings us to the incentive effects of randomization and pragmatic attempts to
account for them. Although pragmatism needs a normative direction, this justification does
not depend on a special value for human equality, nor does it run on uncertainty. Pragmatism
aims to use a sophisticated understanding of human behavior in light of identifiable
incentives for the purpose of optimal legal design.66 The resulting lessons might suggest
randomization in several different ways and settings. In fact, there is no simple description of
the incentive effects of randomization; even when human behavior is predictable, the
perceived effect of randomization depends on the point of comparison.
Consider the common claim that randomization eliminates behavioral incentives and,
as such, is a tool for fighting corruption.68 One might expect people to act in socially
destructive ways in the absence of special care and then find comfort in the rule-like
character of a lottery. A guarantee of equal probabilities ties the hands of error-prone
decision makers while cutting incentives of potential beneficiaries to curry favor with them,
all with the bonus of low decision costs once the rule is in place.69 However much we might
64. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 38, 54, 73, 75, 107–09 (noting the potentially
prohibitive costs of “fine-tuned ... screening”); see also DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 70–71 (noting the issue of
information overload); Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Sidney Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 SOC. RES.
757, 758–65, 773–74 (1977) (analyzing “picking” as opposed to “choosing” based on preferences and reasons).
65. Otto Neurath, The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive, in OTTO NEURATH,
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: 1913-1946, at 1, 8 (Robert S. Cohen & Marie Neurath trans., eds., 1983); see Harcourt,
supra note 47, at 316 (claiming that modernists nevertheless continue to take leaps of faith); see also ELSTER,
SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 122.
66. See, e.g., ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 1–122 (making the attempt from a rational
choice perspective); see also GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 45–46 (similar, from an egalitarian perspective).
68. See GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 45.
69. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 51–56. Note, however, that a dysfunctional decision environment may
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like decision makers to reward skill or effort, we may lack confidence that the system can do
so adequately at a tolerable cost. From the baseline of merit allocation, therefore, instituting
randomization seems to eliminate incentives.
But randomization can instead preserve incentives among pool members when
compared to a different baseline. Randomization can be used as part of a strategy to cheaply
influence large groups. Decision makers might eschew pervasive monitoring, randomly
sample from the target population, and increase the penalty for noncompliance relative to a
regime with 100 percent detection.70 This kind of logic explains the value of random
sampling for auditing in various settings.71 In addition, randomization can encourage
decisive action by softening decision maker responsibility for particular outcomes.72 One can
imagine lifeboat passengers feeling like murderers if they vote on whom to cast overboard,
and feeling like fair people making the best of a tragic situation if they draw lots.73 It also
has been argued that randomization occasionally prompts amicable settlements. Granting
entitlements to equal probabilities can facilitate efficient bargaining by hoisting a veil of
ignorance, thereby minimizing the significance of private valuation information and strategic
behavior.74 Thus, randomization can reduce incentives for action (compared to merits
judgments) or increase them (compared to blanket enforcement, handwringing, or gameplaying).
c. Information and Experimentation
undermine confidence that randomization can be honestly performed. This is one way in which the case for
lotteries can rest on self-defeating assumptions. For a random case assignment system that was apparently
corrupted by a bribe-taking court official, see DAVID C. STEELMAN & JAMES R. JAMES, ASSURING RANDOMNESS
AND SECURITY IN THE INDIVIDUAL-CALENDAR ASSIGNMENT OF CASES TO JUDGES IN THE CUYAHOGA COUNTY
(OH) COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 1–2, 6 (1988) (National Center for State Courts Technical Assistance Report)
(recognizing that “any system for random case assignment can be subverted.”).
70. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 177–81
(1968) (attempting to model such trade-offs). Getting the penalty right depends on, among other factors, the
degree of risk aversion expected in the monitored class, see generally Harcourt, supra note 47, at 336–37
(discussing sentencing lotteries), and whether the risk of penalty increases with the amount of regulated
conduct, see Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 279, 280–83, 298–99 (1986) (analyzing the effect of legal uncertainty on overcompliance,
undercompliance, and the optimal penalty multiplier).
71. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 923 (2006) (regarding random inspection of containers at ports). On the possibilities
of auditing government agencies as well, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227 (2006). It is worth noting that a greater spread of potential sacrifice can have political
effects congenial to egalitarian projects. With shared risks come shared interests and the possibility of an
engaged class of citizens who demand policies that serve the broad public interest. See DUXBURY, supra note 8,
at 56–57; GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 95–96. But such large-pool lotteries must be constructed in the first
place. Implementing risk expansions to engineer a different political environment is impossible if successful
implementation requires the political environment meant to be created by the expansion.
72. See GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 97-99.
73. Accord id. (asserting relief from responsibility as a benefit of lotteries).
74. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean
Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1034–36, 1073–77 (1995) (arguing that ownership ambiguity can dampen
incentives to over- or understate private valuation, though emphasizing that other transaction costs might be
more important).
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Finally, randomization is a foundation for learning and experimentation. It provides a
way to convert difficult choices into intermediate steps. As the modern analogue to
divination, today’s best empirical studies on causation often rely on random assignments to
treatment and control groups.75 Random assignment across a sufficient number of cases
should equalize unaccounted for variables,76 which helps explain its promotion by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration for use in clinical drug trials.77 This experimental function
holds even when lotteries are chosen for other reasons. For example, the Vietnam draft
lottery was not chosen because of what researchers might learn about the effects of military
service on later life, but it did offer up a natural experiment.78 Similarly, randomization can
be used intentionally to draw representative samples from a population of interest.79 The
samples can be studied at lower cost than can the entire population. Many government
agencies use sampling for this informational purpose, starting with a measurement of the
nation’s monthly unemployment rate in 1939.80 Whether by policy intervention or statistical
sampling, randomization can serve the function of information collection in the hope of
improving future decisions.
Of course, randomized decision making has serious drawbacks.81 Statistical
randomization is a freakishly effective leveler that cannot distinguish the good, the bad, and
the ugly. It might reduce incentives not only to appear needful but also to actually become
meritorious. Randomization may undermine constructive planning as well, and it will not
provide reasons for particular outcomes. One can argue with a decision maker’s decision to
randomize but not with a randomization device’s output. This can be distressing.
Furthermore, the semi-mindlessness of randomization separates individual decision makers
from particular outcomes. People still bear responsibility for deciding to randomize, yet
randomization interferes with a regime of accountability and associated effort. In addition,
75. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2008) (noting that a characteristic of adequate and well-controlled clinical
studies is assignment by randomization).
76. See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy Research, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 63, 66–67 (offering a brief restatement); Donald T. Campbell, Legal Reforms as
Experiments, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 217, 217-18 (1970) (offering a classic endorsement); see also Ann Oakley, A
Historical Perspective on the Use of Randomized Trials in Social Science Settings, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 315,
316–25 (2000) (offering a brief history). It appears that the first uses of randomization in experiments did not
occur until the late nineteenth century. See Ian Hacking, Telepathy: Origins of Randomization in Experimental
Design, 79 ISIS 427, 431–34, 438–40, 447–49 (1988) (discussing use of randomizers to test telepathic abilities).
Experimental trials are much older, in agriculture for example, but randomization does not seem to be part of
that history. See id. at 430–31.
77. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(a), (b)(2)(i)-(iv), (b)(4) (2008).
78. See Joshua D. Angrist, Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social
Security Administrative Records, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 313, 313–14 (1990).
79. See Martin R. Frankel & Lester R. Frankel, Fifty Years of Survey Sampling in the United States, PUB.
OPINION Q., Winter 1987, at S127, S128.
80. See id.; see also JOSEPH W. DUNCAN & WILLIAM C. SHELTON, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REVOLUTION IN
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATISTICS 1926-1976, at 50 (1978) ; Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On
Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 161, 166–68 (2008) (stating that randomized tax audits are
essential information gathering tools).
81. See, e.g., GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 46–47 (listing objections to lotteries).
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randomization’s nifty slicing power in situations of indivisibility might be distracting. We
should not neglect the possibility that scarcity can be ameliorated at tolerable cost, just as we
should remember that randomization requires normative judgments about what to
randomize.83 Indeed, preserving large domains for merits and markets can prevent scarcity in
the first place.
Randomization’s flight from individualized merits judgments and decision-maker
responsibility suggests that often it will be undesirable. But randomization should be most
attractive when competing claims to an indivisible good appear equally strong, when people
will behave in socially destructive ways under an alternative decision rule, and when
randomizing is likely to yield insights for future decision making.
3. Three Examples in Government
Although restating the proper domain for randomization in decision making is
challenging, it is more than a parlor game. Even government decision making has a modest
tradition of deliberate randomness. In the United States, official randomization dates back to
the organization of government in 1789.84 Allocation of the first Senators to three different
election classes was done, in part, by lot.85
Among the best known contemporary instances is the military draft for the Vietnam
War. The decision to compel people to serve comes with the issue of whom to compel. One
option is to rely on officials to choose conscripts based on fitness. The Vietnam draft relied
in part on this model, but there was room for abuse, with different draft boards using
different tests and affording preferential treatment among equally fit conscripts.86 In 1969,
the President ordered the next round of conscripts to be chosen randomly from a pool of
nineteen to twenty-five year olds.87 Of course, discretion and gaming were not eliminated,
and many thought the war misguided in the first place. Yet randomization becomes palatable
when a national obligation requires resources from many, but not all people, each of whom
are presumptively equally entitled to avoid service. If the government could acquire reliable
information at no cost, it might conscript only the fittest people with the lowest opportunity
costs, but a crudely defined lottery pool might be the best first step.88
A second example comes from the same era, but it was a conscious effort to
experiment. By the 1960s, some welfare-state reformers were pushing a negative income tax,
with reduced benefits as income from other sources increased.89 One debatable concern was
83. Accord Carol Necole Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Property
Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 73 (2005).
84. See Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1357 (2008).
85. See id. at 1357-58 (noting the combination of deliberation with chance).
86. See GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT 1940-1973, at 169–70, 172–73, 180, 231 (1993).
87. See Exec. Order No. 11,497, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,019 (Nov. 26, 1969); FLYNN, supra note 86, at 224–58
(discussing the political back story).
88. See, e.g., Harvard Study Group, On the Draft, 9 THE PUB. INT. 93, 95 (1967) (supporting a lottery for the
Vietnam draft and opposing student deferments).
89. See Robert A. Moffitt, The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy, J. ECON.
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that a guarantee would reduce work incentives to an unacceptably low level.90 In response,
large-scale randomized trials costing hundreds of millions of dollars were run to test certain
effects of the idea.91 Random samples of households receiving support from Aid to Families
with Dependent Chilcren (AFDC) were either kept within the existing system or given
various levels of guaranteed income.92 Although the experiments have been criticized,93 they
were an effort at informed policymaking with intriguing results. The experiments suggested
to some observers that the labor supply effect was not dramatic across different benefitreduction rates, though beneficiaries did participate in the labor market less than those who
received no welfare assistance.94 We can debate the propriety of experimenting on (only)
low-income people,95 but we can also sympathize with random policy intervention to acquire
knowledge.
A third example shows randomization in an arguably less flattering light. From 1960
until 1987, the federal government used lotteries to distribute oil and gas leases for certain
government-owned lands.96 Leases for lands with known resource potential were supposed
to be auctioned while other never-leased land was given first-in-time to qualified applicants
and the remainder was distributed by lottery to applicants who paid a nominal fee.97 It is
difficult to see why auctions were not the better solution, even if large amounts of
government land would remain unleased. A lottery will not reward knowledge about drilling
prospects and it awards leases regardless of applicant need or ability. Those who applied for
leases were often unable to exploit any resources present; those who were had to track down
the leaseholder and negotiate.98 This might be a small transaction cost, but an auction skips

PERSP., Summer 2003, at 119, 120 [hereinafter Moffitt, Negative Income Tax].
90. See Robert A. Moffitt, The Role of Randomized Field Trials in Social Science Research: A Perspective
From Evaluations of Reforms of Social Welfare Programs, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 506, 509 (2004)
[hereinafter Moffitt, Role of Randomized Field Trials].
91. See WILLIAM M. EPSTEIN, WELFARE IN AMERICA: HOW SOCIAL SCIENCE FAILS THE POOR 90–91 (1997);
Moffitt, Negative Income Tax, supra note 89, at 120.
92. See Moffitt, Role of Randomized Field Trials, supra note 90, at 509–10.
93. See Gary Burtless, The Work Response to a Guaranteed Income: A Survey of Experimental Evidence, in
LESSONS FROM THE INCOME MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENTS 22–25 (Alicia H. Munnell ed., 1987) (reviewing the
debate).
94. See Moffitt, Role of Randomized Field Trials, supra note 90, at 509.
95. See David Greenberg, Mark Shroder & Matthew Onstott, The Social Experiment Market, J. ECON. PERSP.
Summer 1999, at 157, 159, 162 (finding that, when the government uses randomized trials, it tends to test
proposals aimed at the disadvantaged rather than existing programs or proposals aimed at other groups).
96. See Thomas L. Sansonetti & William R. Murray, A Primer on the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing
Reform Act of 1987 and Its Regulations, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 375, 380–82 (1990).
97. See id. at 380–81. Apparently, high potential land had sometimes fallen into a first-in-time category,
which led to “mob scenes.” CARL J. MAYER & GEORGE A. RILEY, PUBLIC DOMAIN, PRIVATE DOMINION: A
HISTORY OF PUBLIC MINERAL POLICY IN AMERICA 198 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Later, approximately 97 percent of all leases were allocated by lottery. See id. at 318.
98. MAYER & RILEY, supra note 97, at 198 (noting that many lease winners sell their leases to oil and gas
companies, often for six-figure sums).
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that step and the government would remain free to distribute the proceeds to the
disadvantaged or to anyone else.99
II. RANDOMIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY
We have seen that randomization is normatively plausible in certain decision
situations and unacceptable in others. Given a sufficient number of decisions, randomization
ought to comprise a nontrivial fraction of decision rules selected, assuming that decision
makers are rational. With hundreds of thousands of disputes adjudicated in the administrative
state and in various judiciaries every year, one might guess that coin flipping would become
standard in a number of close merits questions. But it has not. In fact, government decision
making is rarely randomized, and nearly never for the purpose of adjudicating merits issues.
Yet when push comes to shove, judges have not seriously resisted randomization, either.
Sometimes judges actually encourage it.101 This Part attempts to sort out the judicial position
on randomization.
A. Judicial Self-Regulation
1. Sanctions and General Opposition
For judges, flipping coins is an easy way to draw misconduct sanctions. It is a basis
for penalties well beyond mere reversal by an appellate court. Every decade or so, a judge
overtly randomizes a merits decision and the reaction from those who punish judicial
misconduct is uniformly negative.102 Much of this aversion involves public relations.
Arbiters of judicial discipline are convinced that citizens will not tolerate merits
randomization. “A court of law is not a game of chance,” as one misconduct commission put
it.104 “The public has every right to expect that a jurist will carefully weigh the matters at
issue and, in good faith, render reasoned rulings and decisions.”105 On a public relations
theory, moreover, it makes sense to sanction a judge for simply appearing to randomize
merits issues even if the judge actually decides the case on other grounds. This has, in fact,
been done.106
Perhaps any judicial tolerance for randomization in adjudication is incompatible with
survival-level legitimacy for the court system. A public with little information about judicial
performance might see coin flips as a sign that judges are not taking their jobs seriously, that
99. The best defense of this lottery probably involves incentives and politics. Perhaps officials could not be
trusted to appropriately allocate the proceeds from an auction and, with the risk of untapped land remaining in
government hands, a lottery for applicants was a convenient compromise to achieve a measure of useful
privatization.
101. See infra notes 144–53 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301, 302, 307 (La. 1976); Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm’n of
Va. v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648, 650, 652, 658 (Va. 2007).
104. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 84, 88 (1984) (In re
Friess).
105. Id.; see Coons, supra note 8, at 110 (“People resist having their noses rubbed in the randomness of the
system.”); see also Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 610–11 (1985) (similar).
106. See Daniels, 340 So. 2d at 307 (sanctioning a trial judge who appeared to decide guilt by coin flip,
regardless of the actual basis for decision).
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law often can do no better than chance, or that judges enjoy lording the power of chance over
hapless litigants.107 In addition, banning merits randomization could bolster an image of
courts as unique systems of reason set apart from other public offices, and from arbitration.
Instead of metaphorically splitting babies, courts might fashion themselves as institutions
that not only offer decisive resolution of contested issues upon request, but that provide
rational explanations for every significant decision they make.
In fact, judges can be sanctioned for randomization even if they first make efforts to
decide a contested issue on other grounds and even if they show respect for the difficulties of
judgment. Consider the disciplinary proceedings against Judge Helen Brown, a family court
judge in Michigan.108 In a divorce case, she had temporarily placed two children with their
maternal grandparents and the biological father then renewed his demand for custody.109
While that issue was pending, the father and the grandparents argued over where the children
should spend Christmas Eve as opposed to Christmas Day.110 Despite Judge Brown’s
encouragement, the parties could not resolve this relatively minor dispute on their own.111
With each side’s arguments “equally compelling,”112 the judge ordered the question resolved
by a coin flip and the father was awarded custody for Christmas Eve.113
Judge Brown was censured,114 but as a matter of decision theory and the disciplinary
record, her resort to randomization seems perfectly rational. As far as we can tell, she faced
two options that were equally supported on the available information. She was not charged
with sloth or misunderstanding the arguments.115 And she faced a choice that other judges
might have decided on questionable grounds—for example, by a tiebreaking preference for
older couples over fathers, or vice versa. Publicly flipping a coin to resolve this merits issue
was nevertheless intolerable to the state’s high court, and threatening enough to warrant
discipline rather than mere reversal and remand.116 In this way, Elster’s hope for
107. See, e.g., Shull, 651 S.E.2d at 658 (concluding that “tossing a coin in a courtroom to decide a legal issue
pending before the court .... denigrated the litigants whose case he decided and subjected our justice system to
ridicule”); ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 86–87 (barring a judge from office for using a coin toss to
decide whether to sentence a defendant to 20 days in jail rather than 30 days, which assertedly “undermined
public respect for the judiciary”).
108. See In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Mich. 2003).
109. See id. at 736.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id. (quoting the adopted findings of the Judicial Tenure Commission).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 733.
115. See id. at 737.
116. Judge Brown’s coin flip did attract local media attention. See David Ashenfelter, Judge Uses Coin Flip
to Decide Custody, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 8, 2002 (reporting that a chief judge in the county indicated that
the coin flip showed a lack of seriousness); see also Brown, 662 N.W.2d at 737 (Weaver, J., concurring) (“The
press coverage surrounding the misconduct greatly increased both the public’s knowledge of the incident and,
consequently, the public’s trust and confidence in the judiciary was damaged.”); id. at 742 (reporting a
Commission conclusion that Judge Brown had “denigrated the judicial process and legal system”). It should be
noted that Brown faced a second misconduct charge, see id. at 734 (regarding involvement with a charitable
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randomization in certain custody disputes117 fell to Neurath’s feared “reproach of frivolity or
cynicism.”118
Judicial opposition to randomization extends further. It reaches statistical sampling of
contested cases, even when doing so could save substantial decision costs.119 Lower federal
courts seem unwilling to randomly sample from a plaintiff class to resolve similar issues for
all plaintiffs.120 This is true despite the possibility that collateral estoppel will have a similar
effect. In fact, lower courts are open to early scheduling of randomly selected bellwether
trials with the expectation that similar cases will thereafter settle accordingly or be subject to
preclusion.121 The resort to rough substitutes for outright resolution by random sampling
reinforces a sense of judicial aversion to randomizing merits questions. Parties are entitled to
believe that their situations are special, or will otherwise be advantaged by additional
process, and seek a more personalized trial.122 Yet judicial willingness to expedite bellwether
trials means that, practically speaking, a deliberate lottery will influence outcomes.
The best-known judicial statements on individualized case assessment in opposition
to randomization are found in the Eighth Amendment field. A coalition of justices in the
early 1970s repudiated capital sentencing for inadequately identifying those defendants who
were the most appropriate candidates for death sentences.123 The old regime was likened to
“a lottery system” executing “a random few”124—“a capriciously selected random handful”
more or less “struck by lightning.”125 Part of this criticism seemed to be about rarity; perhaps
organization), which might or might not make her randomization look worse.
117. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 163–74 (defending randomization in some
cases of real uncertainty as to the best parent where children will likely be hurt by delay).
118. Neurath, supra note 65, at 8–9 (discussing the prospect of officials drawing lots).
119. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 546 (1998)
(advocating “randomly sampling damages without apology”).
120. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 219–20 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying class certification),
rev’g Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (approving sampling to
prove plaintiff class reliance on “light” cigarette messages); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297,
319–21 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting, under state law and the Seventh Amendment, adjudication of all class
damages claims based on a random sample of claims). But see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 783–87
& nn.10–11 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding, against a due process objection, the use of a random sample to
determine the fraction of valid claims for purposes of recovery from a common pool). For a claim that the trend
is toward adjudication by sampling in mass tort, see Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at
the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 970 (2007).
121. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. Implantable Defibrillator Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CIV 05MD1726, 2007
WL 846642, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2007) (ordering bellwether trial proceedings by random sampling of
plaintiffs and a peremptory strike process); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Fourth) §§ 20.132, 22.315
(2004) [hereinafter MANUAL] (recommending random sampling or agreement on typicality for bellwether
trials).
122. See MANUAL, supra note 121, at § 22.81.
123. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); id. at 249, 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 293, 304–05 (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 295 (criticizing unguided jury discretion); see
also id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (finding “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it
is imposed”).
125. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (criticizing a penalty “so wantonly and so freakishly imposed,”
although suggesting race bias as an explanation). Note that the “random” or apparently purposeless or
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a punishment seldom used would have little influence on behavior.126 But the justices in the
majority plainly emphasized the problem of imperceptible differences between the
defendants selected for execution and those who were spared. This distribution is an
expected feature of randomization, which must have prompted the analogies to lotteries and
lightning strikes.
Later, a new coalition of justices accepted capital sentencing with additional
guidance to decision makers,128 yet they did not rush to impose flat rules on the sentencing
process. In fact, the Court invalidated state laws that automatically imposed a death sentence
on anyone convicted of first-degree murder,129 without suggested that flat exemptions from
the death penalty were constitutionally problematic. The emerging case law thereby
indicated that the justices favored rarity over clarity in death sentencing.130 Sentencers would
have to consider the facts of individual cases, including the personal story of the defendant
and his argument for mercy. Although this injection of open-ended standards risks the
capriciousness feared in the 1970s, it is consistent with an overarching commitment to
individualized adjudication and inconsistent with the crudeness of flat rules. Randomization
is compatible with rarity in executions; officials could randomly select very few offenders
for death sentences. But statistical randomization is a rule. It cannot rank defendants on
merits or demerits.
A commitment to personalized adjudication should not be taken too seriously,
however. Every adjudication is personalized in the sense that a decision rule is brought to
bear on a particular case. Nothing changes if the decision rule is flat and broad rather than
flexible and case-sensitive. Second, to the extent that personalization means a preference for
standards over rules, it will have only limited force. An unbending rule in favor of standards
is naïve,131 not to mention contradictory. For their part, courts regularly produce rules,
trading decision costs for error costs across time. Consider judicially imposed limits on
punitive damages. Recently, the Court estimated the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages in past cases and used that number to set a ceiling for future
maritime cases involving recklessness.132 In capital sentencing, the true test of judicial
opposition to randomization would be a trial system that accurately identified a small set of
patternless selection of a victim has been used as an aggravating circumstance that justifies imposition of a death
sentence. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(9) (2009); Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440, 445-46 (Nev. 2002).
126. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 293–94, 299–302 (Brennan, J., concurring).
128. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195–206 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J., joint opinion).
129. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301–05 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J., joint
opinion).
130. See id. at 304 (calling for individualized assessments within classes of convicted defendants); see also
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (reiterating that the death penalty must be reserved for the
most serious crimes and the most deserving perpetrators).
131. Cf. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41–42 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary.”).
132. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624–27, 2632–34 (2008). I will not attempt to
square this rulemaking with lower court unwillingness to resolve mass tort claims by sampling.
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the most deserving defendants and then randomly selected half of them for life sentences.
This lottery would impose a kind of rule favoring leniency without necessarily setting off
alarms under established doctrine.133
That said, statistical randomization is not the type of rule that judges ordinarily
tolerate for their merits decisions. Assuring adverse parties a 50-50 chance of victory
happens to conflict with several conventional commitments in adjudication. A
straightforward conflict occurs with respect to the imposition of proof burdens attached to
particular elements of a claim or defense. Requiring proof more likely than not on relevant
evidence is plainly different from offering a 50 percent chance of victory regardless. This is
true whether the elements at issue are hard-line rules or vague standards, and even if litigated
cases are more likely to be hard cases.134 When demand for judgment based on evidence
relevant to a given law is strong, the plausibility of randomization fades.
There is one exception to the strong judicial norm against overt merits randomization
in adjudication. In some states, courts may partition jointly owned land into plots of roughly
equal value and then allocate these plots across owners by lot.135 The owners might trade
their plots after this initial allocation, but courts have orchestrated lotteries to facilitate land
partition.136
Depending on the objectives of property law in this context, a lottery may fit well
with the overlapping justifications for randomization presented in Part I. If we generously
assume that a physical partition is justified, then the joint owners face a kind of indivisibility
problem. Sharing plots is off the table and they need a method for allocating each portion of
the land to one owner. Furthermore, opting into joint ownership might entail at least
presumptively equal claims to any given plot upon partition. This could be the advertised
consequence of choosing this form of ownership (along with disincentives for personalizing
plots). In any event, figuring out who has the strongest claim to any particular plot will
sometimes be impossible or not worthwhile. A lottery is a low-cost decision rule, once
equally valued plots are identified. Information problems can also animate unfortunate
strategic behavior, which can exacerbate the information problems. For instance, if judges
were asked to allocate parcels according to the highest value user, a low value user might
attempt to appear most deserving in order to obtain a particular parcel for the purpose of
selling it. Finally, permitting negotiation and transfer of parcels after a lottery will limit its

133. Cf. ANTHONY EVERITT, AUGUSTUS: THE LIFE OF ROME’S FIRST EMPEROR 70 (2006) (explaining the
ancient practice of decimation, which involved execution of 10 percent of a pool). Contrast the position of the
justices who indicated that a purely random clemency process in the executive branch would violate due
process. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
134. Cf. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 215, 216–19 (1985) (exploring determinants of settlement).
135. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Judicial Partition of Land by Lot or Chance, 32 A.L.R. 4th 909, 910–15
(1984).
136. See Robertson v. Robertson, 484 S.E.2d 831, 835 (N.C. App. 1997).
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significance. In this setting, any unsettling drama associated with randomization is
ameliorated by the opportunity of affected parties to adjust allocations afterward.
The partition exception is not curious because it is especially difficult to justify, but
because it is so isolated. With respect to judicial decisions on the merits, partition lotteries
are the only arguably consistent use of randomization. Outside of this exception, judges risk
not only reversal but professional sanctions for randomizing on the merits. It could be that
land partition lotteries enjoy unique staying power based on biblical support.137 In addition,
these lotteries are sometimes expressly authorized by state statute.138 Perhaps the
endorsement of another political institution helps sustain the practice. But none of this
explains the otherwise virulent judicial resistance to merits randomization in court, a
resistance that comes with costs.
2. Problems with a Randomization Ban
It cannot be that the theoretically optimal number of occasions for randomization on
a merits question, across the millions of cases annually adjudicated in courts and
administrative agencies, is zero. In a subset of these cases, however small, randomization
will be the theoretically superior option for reasons of practical indivisibility, equality norms,
nagging uncertainty, incentive effects, and/or experimental value. That we have difficulty
identifying this class of cases with precision is no reason to think it is an empty set. A strict
prohibition on randomization, moreover, is likely to have problematic side effects.
The first worry is that adjudicators manufacture false certainty.139 This can happen in
at least three ways. Adjudicators might convince themselves that they have ascertained the
relevant norms, historical information, and predictions with greater confidence than they
should rationally possess. Similarly, they might hold to initial impressions and avoid
working too hard on difficult questions in order to avoid the conclusion of indeterminacy.140
Or they might privately accept the uncertainty but attempt to convince observers that
conventional legal argument yields a single superior outcome. The first reaction is a form of
denial, the second is avoidance, and the third is false advertising. Perhaps these reactions are
defensible on consequentialist grounds, but they suggest the debatable status of a merits
randomization ban.141
137. See Numbers 26:52–56 (King James) (relating God’s instructions to Moses regarding land allocation
across tribes).
138. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-6-48 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1216 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. §
668-7(4) (2008).
139. Cf. Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the
Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 270 (1961) (indicating that judges might acquire false confidence in
their judgments and be less on guard against “bias and prejudice” if they unrealistically believe in the power of
their “objective” analysis to close all cases).
140. I thank Mark Kelman for suggesting this point.
141. See DUXBURY, supra note 8, at 114–16 (following PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 17,
21 (1998)); ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 121 (“Honesty requires us to recognize the
pervasiveness of uncertainty and incommensurability, rather than deny or avoid it.”); Harcourt, supra note 47,
at 316, 334 (criticizing repeated leaps of faith).
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This raises the question of how decision makers deal with uncertainty that they are
willing to accept when randomization is out of the question. A possibility is that legally
prohibited grounds of decision creep in. If the rules of the game truly result in more than one
possible outcome,142 the tiebreaker must come from outside of those rules. One such source
is the personal predilections of the decision maker in the form of impermissible bias, whether
consciously recognized or more implicit in form.143
In the alternative, decision makers might generate official tiebreakers that are worse
than randomization. If law and available information leave uncertainty, adjudicators might
simply produce more rules to eliminate discretion and to avoid flipping coins. Existing
adjudicative systems are littered with such tiebreakers. Plaintiffs ordinarily are supposed to
lose unless they prove liability by a preponderance of the evidence; if a defendant’s liability
is a 50-50 proposition, the tie goes to the defendant.145 Similarly, lower court judgments are
affirmed when the appellate panel is equally divided.146 In partial contrast, habeas corpus
applicants are supposed to prevail if the judge is in “equipoise” on whether a constitutional
error at trial was harmless.147 On the other hand, states are free to mandate a death sentence
if a jury concludes that aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in “equipoise.”148
Relatively general rules of decision have similar tiebreaking qualities. We might see canons
of interpretation, presumptions of constitutional validity, review restricted to clear error, and
other supplemental decision rules as akin to tiebreakers.149 These rules are telling. They
indicate deep background commitments. Hence we can characterize the defendants’ edge in
civil litigation as a background preference for private ordering, and the equally divided
affirmance rule as a sign of confidence in the lower courts.150
142. But cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279–90 (1977) (arguing that there is a single
correct answer, even in hard cases, for each decision-maker; but counting a conclusion that a case is “tied” as a
single correct answer).
143. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, The Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 191, 211–14 (2004)
(analyzing randomization as a way to avoid resort to nonpublic reasons).
145. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, The Error of Equal Error Rates, 1 LAW, PROB. & RISK 3, 6 n.10 (2002) (“[S]ome
supplementary argument, such as avoiding transaction costs or a preference for the status quo, is required to
choose between a p > 1/2 rule and a p ≥ 1/2 rule.”).
146. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co., LLC v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1168 (2008) (per curiam); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2109 (2006) (similar result in the absence of a quorum in the Supreme Court, except in cases of direct
appeal from district courts); Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1239 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the appellant loses when the appendix is incomplete and prevents review).
147. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995).
148. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 181 (2006).
149. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting
Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 570–74 (2001) (discussing the use of cannons of
statutory interpretation as tiebreakers in cases of ambiguity); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and
the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 267 (2009) (“When a constitutional question is so close, ... the
tie for many reasons should go to the side of deference to democratic processes.”).
150. Rarely will a court overtly split differences as a tiebreaker. Judges opt for more visibly decisive
outcomes, perhaps leaving difference-splitting to the arbitration system. A rare counterexample is the litigation
over ownership of Barry Bonds’ record-breaking home run baseball. The trial judge was uncertain whether one
claimant had achieved adequate possession before being assaulted by a mob, and he granted equal and
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This proliferation of nominally non-random tiebreakers is not necessarily tragic, but
it is vulnerable to criticism. First is the attack from indeterminacy enthusiasts, who can
attempt to show that every tiebreaking decision rule has a hazy boundary that could call for
the production of yet another tiebreaker.151 For instance, a decision maker must know that
the substantive law and relevant evidence actually yields equipoise or less before awarding
victory to a civil defendant. The boundary of equipoise may be no clearer than the boundary
of preponderance or anything else. If that critique is not entirely successful, there still may
be situations in which tiebreaking decision rules are in tension or conflict.
At minimum, tiebreakers must be justified as a normative matter, insofar as they are
meant to reflect background assumptions or preferences for legal institutions. These rules
might be constructed to tie up loose ends at the fringes of adjudication, but they can be
linked to the deepest and broadest issues of legal design. Consider a prisoner on death row
challenging the constitutional validity of his sentence; his claim is denied by a court of
appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court on an equally divided vote.152 Whatever is the
appropriate method of decision in such situations, it cannot escape difficult judgments.
Given such controversial choices, it remains hard to believe that randomization is
categorically less acceptable as a theoretical matter than all of the tiebreakers currently in
operation.
B. Judicial Oversight
Does judicial opposition to randomization extend further than the courthouse door? If
another institution determines that randomization is appropriate for its own decisions, will
judges intervene? Answering is difficult, in part because only a small set of past cases are
directly relevant. Nonjudicial officials might not be much more enthusiastic than judges
about lotteries, aside from the revenue-generating variety. Even if randomization is seldom
used, however, it has been litigated in several different settings. This section attempts to
estimate the level of judicial tolerance for nonjudicial government lotteries.
1. Possibilities for Global Opposition
As an initial matter, perhaps courts may fairly conclude that randomization in official
decision making is usually prohibited by statute. Scattered statutes do explicitly authorize
lotteries,155 and maybe they are sufficiently unorthodox to be disfavored when courts read
undivided shares to that claimant and a second claimant who ended up holding the ball. See Popov v. Hayashi,
No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3, *7–8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) (finding the two claims to be “of
equal quality” and ordering the ball sold). (I thank Lior Strahilevitz for this example.) However one evaluates
judicial aversion to splitting differences, merits randomization is still possible and it can be used to decisively
award victory to one party over others.
151. There is a connection here to the observation that indeterminacy in legal rules cannot always be resolved
by resort to legal principle, which can reproduce uncertainty. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 6–8, 153–58 (1983).
152. See Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754, 754 (1989) (per curiam).
155. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (regarding excess immigration visas); 20 U.S.C. § 7225d(b) (2006)
(regarding admission to oversubscribed charter schools receiving federal grants); 43 U.S.C. § 1353(b)(2) (2000)
(regarding government oil sales to help small refiners). Actually, the search term “random!” appears in the text
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statutes. Assuming randomization is a controversial decision rule, it might be appropriate to
lean against conclusions that favor official lotteries.156 Officials will not often suffer public
opinion backlash for rejecting randomization, and pervasive randomization in decision
making would produce dystopia.
Regardless of the proper interpretive presumption, a key question is whether the
judiciary will oppose randomization for other institutions when nonjudicial officers plainly
prefer it. Existing judicial doctrine does include abstract principles that might be converted
into an opposition to randomization per se; some of these principles have been categorized as
supreme constitutional law.
One elaboration of equal protection dictates that “like” cases must be treated
“alike.”159 This principle is notoriously vague insofar as it requires additional normative
content to identify relevant characteristics for comparison.160 From one perspective,
however, this vagueness is unimportant when it comes to randomization. Equiprobablistic
lotteries are designed such that all arguably relevant differences among pool members are
blinkered. As to the distribution of outcomes, likes will almost certainly end up treated
unalike, no matter what basis is chosen for judging similarity. Furthermore, unalikes will
have been treated alike at the time that equal chances were distributed, unless everyone in
the pool was, in fact, relevantly alike. Perhaps statistical and orthogonal randomization
devices unjustifiably omit considerations of merit or need (or some other metric) from the
allocation of chances or outcomes.162
Precisely this disconnect can be restated as a due process problem. One elaboration
of due process resists “arbitrary” decisions.163 The meaning of this admonition is open to
debate. Officials usually must exercise some discretion to perform their duties, so its absence
cannot be required across the board. But judicial doctrine might sometimes impose a duty of
of over 100 statutory sections in the U.S. Code, many addressing random sampling. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A. §
1614(a) (2009) (regarding audits of lobbyist compliance with disclosure rules); 6 U.S.C. § 923 (2006)
(regarding a plan for random inspection of containers at ports); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(a)(4) (2000) (regarding a
study of prison rape).
156. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 338 (1999) (holding that a
federal statute prohibited sampling for congressional apportionment); Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v.
Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1239 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (dictum) (asserting that a contract to be bound by a
coin flip could not be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act). But cf. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 457
(2002) (holding that “hot-deck imputation” for missing data was not prohibited “sampling” and was a
permissible method of “actual Enumeration,” without judging the constitutional validity of statistical sampling).
159. See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793, 799 (1997) (similar); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (similar). I discuss this notion of equal
protection not because it is especially attractive, but because it survives in judicial materials.
160. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539–56 (1982) (contending that
this version of equality is derivative of substantive-rights arguments); see also Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is
the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168, 1178 (1983) (“In order to decide what persons are
relevantly equal or unequal, substantive judgments have to be made about what characteristics count.”);
Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1974).
162. This puts aside objections based on who or what is excluded from the pool.
163. E.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006).
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reasoned decision making or instrumental rationality.164 If we focus on the distribution of
outcomes, randomization might violate this principle. As a result of randomization, an
official will have advantaged pool member A and disadvantaged pool member B without any
personalized justification beyond the diktat of an algorithm. This observation does not
explain why the relevant timeframe is after distribution rather than before, when chances
have been equalized, but the complaint is clear enough.
At times, courts have explicitly warned against randomization in constitutional terms.
A good illustration comes from due process opinions, where judges have used randomization
to indicate the outer boundary of otherwise permissible official discretion. The leading
example is probably Justice O’Connor’s discussion of executive clemency.165 Although she
and her fellow concurring justices wanted to allow states a variety of procedural options for
deciding when to soften criminal penalties, these justices also wanted to preserve judicial
oversight in exceptional situations. When might judges intervene? “[A] state official
flip[ping] a coin to determine whether to grant clemency” was one possibility.167 The same
message has been delivered with respect to local zoning decisions, another field in which
today’s judges often display restraint.168 Such statements intimate that randomization
exhausts judicial tolerance for official discretion in locations where deference is otherwise
likely.
But none of this is enough to establish a judicial policy against randomization outside
the courts. The above-noted elaborations of equal protection and due process are
insufficiently precise to get much traction on the judicial position. Neither rational choice
theorists nor egalitarians have unqualified objections to lotteries in social decisionmaking.
The propriety of randomization will depend on factors previously suggested: the
indivisibility of the item to be allocated, the strength of any equality presumption, the degree
of uncertainty, behavioral incentives, the benefits of experimentation, and the

164. See, e.g., id. at 325, 331 (using “arbitrary” to characterize a rule of evidence, in the sense of failing to
identify a rational relationship between the rule and a legitimate goal); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
500 (1954) (rejecting segregation in D.C. public education as arbitrary in this sense); Thunberg v. Strause, 682
A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 1996) (defining “arbitrary” in an attorney misconduct statute partly in terms of randomness).
But cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1989) (referring to “random or
arbitrary” acts in a discussion of the warrant clause and suggesting concern about unchecked officer discretion).
165. See Oh. Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289–90 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(concluding that due process was afforded in this case, however). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was joined
by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. Id. at 288. Justice Stevens dissented. For indication that
unfettered official discretion is easier to defend than randomized clemency, see Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d
442, 446 (7th Cir. 2006) (illustrating a “wholly arbitrary” decision by reference to a coin flip, but holding that a
discretionary parole system does not provide an entitlement on which to ground due process claims).
167. Woodward, 523 U.S. at 289; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253–54 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (stating that judicial intervention might be warranted if the Senate “tried” an impeached official by
coin flip); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 698 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that a judge
could neither blindly rely on a magistrate nor flip a coin).
168. See Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) (referring to such
a decision as “truly irrational” and a violation of substantive due process).
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counterarguments for nonrandom distribution at acceptable decision costs.170 Nothing in a
judge’s offhand disparagement of randomization forecloses these considerations. If decision
theorists are correct, then a perfectly well constructed decision process can recommend
randomization for a subset of all social decisions. Within that subset, pool members may be
equal in fact or equal as far as we know, and the advantages of randomization will outrun the
complications.
2. Litigation over Randomization
In fact, the most relevant judicial decisions are permissive. When courts have
examined challenges to deliberate randomization in official decision making, the challenges
have failed. Of course, official lotteries may be poorly designed or out of place—the oil and
gas lease lottery program might be an example.173 But that is true of government decision
making in general. There seems to be nothing in the scarce randomization case law to
indicate a unique level of judicial skepticism for official lotteries, and occasionally judges
promote randomization.
Only a handful of judicial opinions confront the validity of random allocation
schemes, but existing cases show tolerance. For example, Schenck v. City of Hudson175
upheld a slow-growth ordinance that incorporated a lottery. City officials had capped the
number of residential development projects per annum and then used a stratified lottery to
allocate development certificates.176 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that randomization would
save administrative costs and prevent uncomfortably subjective decision making.177
Likewise, a state appellate court upheld random selection among civil service applicants.178
Having received more than 2000 valid applications for only twenty firefighter positions, city
officials decided to randomly select 800 applicants for further competitive testing.179 The
court found this use of randomization to be a fair cost-saving device.180 In a similar spirit, a
district court upheld random selection of ballots as part of a proportional representation
plan.181 Voters would rank all candidates, their ballots would be counted according to a
random ordering by the polling place, and as soon as any candidate hit a certain threshold of
first-choice votes, second choices would be counted on any subsequent ballots ranking that

170. See supra Part I.B.2.
173. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
175. 114 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 1997).
176. See id. at 592–93 & n.4 (describing an 80 percent set aside for priority projects such as lots with
preexisting plat approval, affordable housing, and large-lot developments).
177. See id. at 595 (reversing the grant of a preliminary injunction). The scarcity created by the City’s
development cap requires independent justification.
178. See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 363 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
179. See id. at 887.
180. See id. at 889 (finding the procedure reasonable and consistent with the City charter). Again, to be a
sound policy, the scarcity in firefighter positions must be justified. We can safely assume that Minneapolis did
not need to hire hundreds more firefighters.
181. See Campbell v. Bd. of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94, 102–05 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (denying a preliminary
injunction on equal protection and due process claims).
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candidate first.182 The order of counting could therefore influence results, and yet it was a
fairly cheap and tamper-resistant method for a pre-digital age. These cases might show
judges fearing corruption, but they display openness to official randomization regardless.
Judicial treatment is similar in the few cases examining randomized policy
experiments. The leading case is Aguayo v. Richardson,183 which presented a compromise in
the welfare benefits context. In one experiment, New York officials could require training
and/or work for certain family members in AFDC households; but these requirements could
be imposed on only a subset of all social service districts in the State.185 Although the
opinion does not explain precisely how districts were selected for inclusion, the court of
appeals did endorse a “random but rational” criterion designed to gain information: “The
Equal Protection clause does not place a state in a vise where its only choices in dealing with
the problems of welfare are to do nothing or plunge into statewide action.”186 The court did,
however, grant a preliminary injunction against the State’s plan to suspend benefits for
certain experimental recipients who did not conform to compliance demands during a
dispute resolution process.187 This ruling softened the State’s preferred experiment, at least
until the due process arguments were developed, while permitting an experiment of some
kind.188
It is possible to see judicial resistance to random sampling in some Fourth
Amendment cases, but any opposition is weak. Depending on the pool subject to search or
seizure, statistically random invasions for law enforcement purposes can trigger adverse
judicial reactions. If officials lack probable cause with respect to everyone in the pool, then
randomized searches are vulnerable to judicial rebuff in the absence of special
circumstances. Random drug testing cases deliver this message.189 However, the objection
here is not to randomization per se. These cases involve combinations of low ex ante
suspicion followed by random selection; they do not repudiate random sampling when
suspicion is stronger for the entire class. Justice Stevens made this point in a recent dissent
182. See id. at 98–99.
183. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
185. See id. at 1094–96.
186. Id. at 1109–10; see also id. at 1109 (observing the usefulness of controlled experiments in medical and
social inquiry); Campbell, 310 F. Supp. at 105 (“Chance, if a rational basis exists for its employment, cannot be
said to be an irrational factor.”).
187. See Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1095, 1111–12.
188. Lower courts have themselves instituted experimental procedures that affect litigants. See Kimbrough v.
Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 567, 574–75 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (upholding an arbitration referral experiment
adopted in three federal districts against an equal protection challenge); HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE
COURT 244–45 (2d ed. 1978) (citing an expert witness experiment); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil
Rules, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67, 79–80 (collecting a few examples of randomized
experiments).
189. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826–29 (2002) (upholding random drug testing for
students in extracurricular activities given the “special needs” of public schools); see also MacWade v. Kelly,
460 F.3d 260, 263–65 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding orthogonally random searches of subway passenger containers
to prevent terrorist attacks); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 614–16, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding
random selection of airline passengers for handheld magnetometer scanning).
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that provoked no objection from the majority. He asserted that police officers may randomly
select which of numerous speeders to stop and ticket, when all cannot feasibly be stopped.191
In fact, a theme in Fourth Amendment cases is discomfort with discretion among beat
officers.192 Once a pool of potential targets is chosen, statistical randomization is a way of
constraining official discretion, not enhancing it.193
Our case review would be less impressive were it not for instances of judges
reinforcing or encouraging randomization policies. A striking example is Stodolsky v.
Hershey,194 which dealt with the 1969 military draft lottery. The President had ordered “a
random selection sequence for induction.”195 When the lottery dealt the plaintiffs relatively
low draft numbers, they attacked the process as not truly “random” and claimed that a
departure from equal probabilities violated the President’s order and due process
requirements.196 They alleged that lottery numbers representing birthdays were insufficiently
mixed together in the urn from which they were drawn, such that later birthdays (for
example, December 31) were more likely to be drawn early than early birthdays (for
example, January 1).197 In response, a district judge defined randomness for this situation as
equal probability, and concluded that the President’s order required it to be “approached as
closely as reasonably possible under all the circumstances.”198 As a normative matter, it is
not clear why statistical randomization should be preferred to the orthogonal randomness of
birthdays themselves. The selection process might have been morally acceptable if it picked
only December birthdays.199 Perhaps the plaintiffs’ objection seemed plausible because
statistical randomization really was what the President had in mind and procedural regularity

191. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2159–60 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion struck an even more permissive note, characterizing such decisions as inherently discretionary.
See id. at 2154.
192. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655–57, 662–63 (1979) (discussing automobile stops
without individualized reasonable suspicion). Compare an officer’s occasional decision to release an
apprehended suspect based on a coin flip. See PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING
BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 114–15 (2008) (reporting a Baltimore police officer’s practice with respect to
loitering).
193. For another set of mixed messages, see the doctrine of “random and unauthorized” deprivations by line
officers, which may defeat federal due process claims in favor of state tort or the Federal Tort Claims Act. See,
e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Lipkin v. SEC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617–18 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
194. 2 Selective Serv. L. Rep. 3527, 3528 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
195. Exec. Order No. 11,497, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,019 (Nov. 26, 1969).
196. Stodolsky, 2 Selective Serv. L. Rep. at 3527.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 3528 (denying a motion to dismiss). The court bracketed the due process claim, noting that it
would have “little chance to succeed” if the sequence was “random” within the meaning of the executive order.
Id. at 3527 n.2. For studies finding that the selection process was probably not statistically random, see
Feinberg, supra note 16, at 259–60, and Jorge Mateu et al., The 1970 US Draft Lottery Revisited: A Spatial
Analysis, 53 APPLIED STAT. 219, 220, 229 (2004).
199. Cf. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 45–46 (claiming epistemic randomness was
adequate).
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was especially important to the public. Regardless, the court showed no antipathy to
randomization—quite the opposite.200
In fact, judges occasionally suggest randomization as a solution to controversial
allocation problems. One instance involves public housing. The plaintiffs in Holmes v. New
York City Housing Authority201 asserted that the City was running a delay-ridden system
with no ascertainable method for allocating scarce slots.202 The court of appeals responded
that the plaintiffs had stated a viable due process claim. A system of official discretion was
disparaged as “an intolerable invitation to abuse,” and, if many applicants were judged
equally qualified under prescribed standards, the court suggested that “further selections be
made in some reasonable manner such as ‘by lot or on the basis of the chronological order of
application.’”204 Likewise, an earlier court of appeals case proposed randomization for the
allocation of scarce liquor licenses.205 That court perceived a lottery as superior to official
discretion and the risk of “graft, corruption, and other abuses.”206 Much more recently, the
randomization option arose in affirmative action litigation. Judges opposed to race-based
affirmative action in employment or school admissions episodically point to lotteries as
unproblematic solutions.207
If we take these suggestions seriously, we are now able to identify a smattering of
situations in which courts permit or encourage randomization by other officials. It is quite
possible for randomization to contradict judicial conceptions of supreme law, but those
conceptions do not rule out randomization. Nor is it apparent that randomization receives
especially skeptical treatment. Judges seem willing to view lotteries in the way that decision
theorists do: as an attractive solution for a class of challenging decision situations.
200. Accord Freeman v. Schoen, 370 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (D. Minn. 1974) (addressing a due process
objection to departure from random selection for consideration in a parole program). The Stodolsky court did
deny plaintiffs a temporary restraining order. See Stodolsky, 2 Selective Serv. L. Rep. at 3528 (citing
widespread reliance on the existing sequence). Later, a court of appeals concluded that the process was
sufficiently “random” in common parlance. See United States v. Kotrlik, 465 F.2d 976, 977 (9th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (indicating the drawing was fair, non-discriminatory, and without deliberate selection of the litigants’
birthdays), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 (1972); see also United States v. Proceeds of Sale of 9,312 Lbs. of
Scallops, 738 F. Supp. 598, 601–03 (D. Mass. 1990) (interpreting a regulation requiring pre-seizure random
sampling and refusing to impose scientific standards of randomness).
201. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
202. See id. at 264.
204. Id. at 265 (citation omitted); see also id. at 265 & n.4 (noting the option of a scoring system based on
each applicant’s current housing situation, but warning about the risk of “arbitrary action”).
205. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
206. Id. at 609 (condemning uncontrolled official discretion as a due process violation), reh’g denied, 330
F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (suggesting stricter eligibility standards, a lottery, or a first-in-time rule
for any equally qualified applicants).
207. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1551 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing layoffs of employees
tied in seniority and deemed equally qualified, noting prior lotteries, and quoting Proverbs 18:18 (New
American)), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997); Pauline T. Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 9, 12–17 (2003) (collecting such arguments). But cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2004)
(stating that a law school could avoid a lottery in light of risks to both student quality and diversity, and
permitting “nuanced judgment” that takes race into account).
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The last example is an outlier but it provides a useful transition. It involves case
assignment. The Louisiana Supreme Court became concerned that prosecutors were
effectively able to choose the judges they preferred in felony cases.208 The calendaring
system could be exploited such that the State had an advantage in the judge-shopping
game.209 As a possible remedy, and as a requirement of state constitutional law, the court
recommended randomized case assignment.210 This is not a trend in constitutional litigation.
Other courts have denied that random assignment is a matter of litigable constitutional
law.211 A refusal to recognize such claims indicates that judges are willing to accept some
legislative direction in this field. But whether judges feel entitled to fashion a case
assignment system, many adjudicative institutions behave consistently with Louisiana’s state
courts and randomize the distribution of cases across judges. This requires an explanation,
and a defense.
C. The Case Assignment Puzzle
The pattern thus far is courts vigorously self-regulating against randomization on
merits questions, while moderating that opposition when they are occasionally asked to
second-guess the randomization policies of other institutions. Thus judicial opposition to
randomization looks parochial—and yet courts themselves provide a leading example of
systematic randomization in American government.
Today the process of assigning cases to judges is pervaded with lotteries. This form
of randomization takes place in courts across the nation, and some administrative agencies
have followed suit. Lotteries are a key part of the case assignment procedure in many federal
district courts, in the federal courts of appeals, in many state trial courts and appellate courts,
in federal immigration courts, and elsewhere.212 Randomization in this form touches perhaps
millions of cases per year.
Unfortunately, greater specificity on randomization’s development within case
assignment systems is difficult to offer. There seems to be no general historical account of
randomization’s rise in so many case assignment protocols, nor an explanation for the
holdouts.213 Nor is there an easily accessible guide to current case assignment practices in,
208 See State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1304 & n.1 (La. 1989) (per curiam).
209. See id. at 1303–04.
210. See id. at 1304 (requiring felony cases to be assigned “on a random or rotating basis or under some other
procedure”); see also Brown & Lee, supra note 8, at 1099–1103 (attempting to marshal arguments against
discretionary case assignment from federal constitutional case law).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Keane, 375
F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
212. See, e.g., Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 24 (2006) (regarding immigration judges); Brown & Lee, supra note 8, at 1069 (regarding
federal circuit courts); Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 292 (1996) (regarding state courts).
213. There is accessible information on the development of single-judge case assignments at the trial court
level and away from so-called master calendar systems, see, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward
Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1587 (2003) (recognizing the shift), but that design choice can be
made independently of the randomization issue.
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for example, the federal district courts. Those procedures are curiously decentralized.214
Unlike federal jury selection, which is subject to statutory guidance,215 judges tend to
determine their own case assignment procedures. Federal statutes authorize district courts to
divide and conduct their business as they see fit,216 and the circuit courts to form panels
howsoever they choose.217 Under this decentralized regime, some courts have not adopted
official rules on case assignment. The relatively small Southern District of Alabama is one. It
has published rules addressing assignment of related and refiled cases, but not ordinary case
assignment.218 Those courts that have formal rules do not necessarily explain in detail how
cases and judges are matched and rematched. Somewhat similarly, the Social Security
Administration lacks a centralized assignment rule for disability benefits appeals.
Assignment mechanics have devolved to individual hearing offices.219 Undoubtedly,
assignment information is available inside each adjudicative system and, at least partly, to
local lawyers. But as of today, it appears that no one source effectively aggregates this
information for outsiders.
Although definitive statements about the particulars of randomization’s role cannot
yet be made, an example or two can help suggest the influence of randomization. Consider
the Southern District of New York. In 2007, it had twenty-eight authorized judgeships and
logged over 17,000 case filings.220 The local rules declare that randomization is a component
214. Our picture of case assignment in the federal courts of appeals is clearer thanks to Brown and Lee’s
extensive survey. In 2000, they reported that “[a]ll circuits purport to use a system of random assignment of
judges and cases” but also “permit a significant amount of discretion in the assignment process.” Brown & Lee,
supra note 8, at 1069, 1074.
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (2006) (requiring random selection of jurors in district courts).
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2006) (authorizing circuit court judicial councils to make necessary orders when
district judges are unable to agree on case assignment rules or orders); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000)
(authorizing court rules “for the conduct of their business” that are not inconsistent with federal statute or rules
issued by the Supreme Court); FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (authorizing local rules by majority vote of district
judges).
217. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006); W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 257–58 (1953)
(indicating courts of appeals’ discretion to allocate work). A statutory constraint is imposed on the Federal
Circuit, which must rotate judges across panels “to ensure that all of the judges sit on a representative cross
section of the cases heard.” 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006).
218. See S.D. ALA. R. 3.3; see also JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 414 (2007) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL BUSINESS] (reporting only three authorized judgeships for the Southern District of Alabama); id. at
141, 210 (tables C & D) (reporting only 346 criminal case filings and 980 civil case filings in the District).
Random assignment might be less likely in jurisdictions allotted few judges and a large geographic territory. It
has been reported that the District of North Dakota assigned its two active duty judges to two different
geographic divisions which handled all cases filed in those divisions. See ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE DISTRICT
OF NORTH DAKOTA, REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1993), reprinted in 69 N.D. L. Rev. 739, 752–
53 (1993). This is not to say that the Southern District of Alabama has rejected random assignment, only that its
practice is not as formalized in official rules as it might be.
219. See OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW, HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION LAW
MANUAL I-2-0-2, I-2-0-5 (2005) (stating that assignment to Administrative Law Judges is controlled by each
Hearing Office’s Chief ALJ). Some SSA hearing offices may employ a randomization element in their
assignment procedure.
220. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 218, at 411 (reporting judgeships); id. at 139, 208 (tables C & D)
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in case assignment: “All cases shall be randomly assigned by the clerk or his designee in
public view in one of the clerk’s offices in such a manner that each active judge shall receive
as nearly as possible the same number of cases.”221 Parties and their attorneys may ask to be
present during case selection.222 Here the commitment to random case assignment is very
public, even if the court will not entertain formal objections from litigants based on the local
rule.223 An analogue from the administrative law world involves international immigration.
The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge authorized a computerized case assignment
system that assigns incoming cases by rotation through lists of available immigration judges
in each immigration court.224
Still, no existing case assignment system is maximally random across all decision
makers. First of all, a decision maker might deliberately circumvent a formal commitment to
randomization.225 In addition, litigants may influence case assignment. To the extent a
plaintiff or prosecutor has discretion over venue, choosing a place to file is also choosing a
pool of judges. Litigants may also attempt to game an otherwise random assignment system.
A tactic used in the past was to file multiple complaints involving the same controversy and
then voluntarily dismiss the complaints that are assigned to the least sympathetic judges.226
Other exceptions to random assignment are officially condoned. Many state court
systems permit parties to exercise peremptory strikes on judges initially assigned.227 Judges
also tend to retain a measure of control. A judge might recuse from a case, or be assigned all
“related cases.” The Southern District of New York’s rule assigns all habeas petitions and
pro se civil suits filed by the same litigant to the same judge.228 Moreover, some systems
(reporting 1026 criminal case filings and 16,125 civil case filings).
221. S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.2(b) (2009); see id. at 50.2(h) (allowing judges who are ill or “overburdened” with
cases to be removed from the wheel, and the chief judge and senior judges to elect a reduced caseload); see
also, e.g., N.D. CAL. ORDER 44 (2003) (describing a random case assignment system, at least for civil cases,
and exceptions); D.D.C. R. 40.3(a) (2008) (similar); N.D. ILL. R. 40.1(a) & 1999 comm. cmt. (2008) (stating
that case assignment is by lot except as specifically provided, that cases are randomized only within predefined
categories, and that randomization has been part of the process for 50 years).
222. See S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.2(b) (2009).
223. The rules indicate they are for internal management and not the basis for objections by litigants. See S. &
E.D.N.Y. R. 50.1 (2008) (preface); see also In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1176-80 (9th Cir. 1986). But cf.
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir. 1972) (issuing a writ of mandamus against a
chief judge who reassigned a randomly assigned case in contravention of written local rules).
224. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM DOCKETING SYSTEM
MANUAL III-1 (April 2009) (“In multiple Immigration Judge courts, cases are assigned to each Immigration
Judge’s Master Calendar on a random rotational basis.”).
225. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 46 (2005) (describing reasons to doubt that certain major bankruptcy cases were
randomly assigned to bankruptcy judges in New York in the 1980s); see also Brown & Lee, supra note 8, at
1044–65 (discussing allegations that certain civil rights cases were assigned in the Fifth Circuit to influence
outcomes).
226. See, e.g., David Heckelman, 2 Lawyers Censured for Multiple-Suit Forum Shopping, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 28, 1995, at 1.
227. See Norwood, supra note 212, at 293 & n.128 (reporting that 19 states allowed preemptory strikes but
that federal legislation on the matter had failed).
228. See S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.3(e) (2008).
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incorporate the possibility of discretionary departures from random assignment. The
Southern District of Florida’s rules announce that assignments may be modified “whenever
necessary in the interest of justice and expediency.”229 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, which is itself composed of judges selected by the Chief Justice, determines
which district judge will receive transferred actions without any commitment to
randomization.230 Official rules might also enable judges to trade cases. The Southern
District of New York’s local rules authorize its chief judge to reassign any case with the
consent of the judges involved.231 Additionally, random court of appeals panels are partially
checked by nonrandom opinion assignment practices.232
More broadly, adjudicative institutions are structured in ways that delimit random
assignment. These boundaries are part of the debate over specialization in adjudication.233
Cases are certainly not randomly assigned across all government adjudicators. The labor is
divided among institutions, such as the immigration system and the traditional court system.
Labor is partitioned again within institutions, such as the various districts within the federal
court system and the divisions and specialized judge assignments within certain trial
courts.234 These boundaries define cohorts of decision makers who will receive one stream of
disputes rather than another.
Also worth noting is the norm in the United States of allowing appeals to an authority
that is not randomized. Thus the decision of an administrative law judge might be appealed
to the unitary head of the relevant department, and state and federal trial court judgments can
be appealed to a supreme court that does not sit in panels.235 Randomization influences case
assignment on the front lines of adjudication, while appellate structures offer the limited
hope of attracting the attention of nonrandomized decision makers at the back end.
From another perspective, however, the above discussion has greatly understated the
role of chance in matching cases to judges. If causal chains in human events are traced back
229. S.D. FLA. R. 3.4(A) (2008).
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b), (d) (2006); 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 9:17 (4th ed. 2002); see also Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief
Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341, 364 (2004).
231. See S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 50.4 (2008).
232. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526–48 (2008)
(concluding that federal appellate judges commonly specialize via opinion-writing assignments).
233. The literature on specialized tribunals is extensive and longstanding. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The
Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and
the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990); Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for
Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951). My point is that institutional
boundaries are forms of specialization, and that intra-institution case assignment systems can retard further
specialization (for example, random assignment) or advance it (for example, merit-driven assignment).
234. See, e.g., Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 11–13, 21 (1997)
(investigating the Cook County Chief Judge’s power to assign judges to different courtrooms entertaining
different subject matter at different prestige levels).
235. Contrast the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, which is a panel. See Andrew
Drzemczewski, The Internal Organisation of the European Court of Human Rights: The Composition of
Chambers and the Grand Chamber, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 234–35, 239–42 (2000).
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far enough, perhaps an observer can always identify an orthogonally, if not statistically
random process that helped produce a dispute that ended up before an agency or a court.
Everything from outcomes in the gene pool236 to the concept of moral luck237 can be
associated with lotteries that seriously influence the course of our lives.
That said, adjudicative institutions often deliberately inject randomization into
disputes at the point of case assignment. Regardless of the uncontrolled forces that influence
adjudication, this intentional use of randomization needs a convincing defense.
Randomization does come with disadvantages. Most obviously, case assignment lotteries fail
to match decision-makers with the cases for which they are best suited. Partly for this reason,
other organizations are not wedded to this form of labor allocation; it is not as if practicing
lawyers normally receive their paid work at random.238 Attempting to appoint multi-talented
judges can do only so much. And there is a further complication: random case assignment
must be squared with a long tradition of judges condemning coin flips on the merits.

III. DECISION MAKERS, DECISIONS, AND RANDOMIZATION
How should we view this combination of judicial positions? Surely some part of the
combination is understandable. If we focus on the many modern justifications for
randomization combined with selective use by nonjudicial officials, there is nothing very
surprising about judges accepting the validity of lotteries in other institutions. Furthermore,
judicial tolerance for nonjudicial randomization rests easily with the spread of case
assignment lotteries within the judiciary. Judges could have adopted their assignment
lotteries based on the same sort of judgment that they respect in nonjudicial institutions.238
Moreover, it might make sense for judges to respect the ability of nonjudicial officials to
decide when lotteries are appropriate while simultaneously taking a hard line against
randomization on the merits in a courtroom. Perhaps judges can find something especially
problematic about merits randomization on their home turf38 without imposing a similar
conclusion on other institutions.
Even if each of these conclusions is correct, however, we are left with an especially
awkward combination: judges habitually randomize case assignments while they routinely
236. See GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 24–29 (discussing genetic lotteries and entrenched social structures);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 63–64 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing a natural lottery of talents, along with
efforts to limit its influence on people’s life chances).
237. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 28 (1979) (discussing arguable connections between bad luck
and moral assessment).
238. For an exceptional instance of random case assignment in a public defender’s office, see David S.
Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney
Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1149, 1160–61, 1164 & n.61 (2007) (noting, however, that the large majority
of 50 other surveyed offices did not do so).
238. See infra Part III.C.2 (defending assignment randomization).
238. See infra Part III.C.1 (defending a merits randomization ban).
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punish merits randomization as fundamentally wrong. The problem is that case assignments
and merits decisions are connected, as Part III.A.1 explains. Case assignment lotteries have a
randomizing effect on merits decisions in hard cases. In its worst light, then, the adjudicative
system is at war with itself. There are perspectives from which this conflict might be denied,
and they are explored in Part III.A.2. But in my judgment, the more fruitful course is to
accept tension within the system and attempt to justify it. This path is admittedly
complicated. Part III.B acknowledges that case assignment lotteries do not effectively
randomize the same class of decisions recommended by ideal theory. The task, therefore, is
to recognize that the system neither eliminates deliberate randomization nor approximates
ideal randomization, and nevertheless defend the arrangement. Part III.C makes the attempt.
The argument depends heavily on the institutional setting of adjudication and the needs of
those who do not wear robes.239
A. Is the System Effectively Randomizing the Merits?
1. Connecting Assignments with Outcomes
If all decision makers were exactly the same, then case assignment would be
irrelevant to outcomes. We could treat the adjudicative system as if it had only one decision
maker, and case assignment would be decoupled from the distribution of merits decisions.
Randomizing decision makers certainly would not mimic flipping coins on the merits, and
there would be no serious conflict between a formal ban on merits randomization and a
lottery-influenced case assignment system.
The truth is that decision makers are different in outcome-relevant ways. Within the
same institution, such as a federal circuit or an administrative agency, decision makers can
seriously differ along many dimensions. These personnel might have wildly different
knowledge bases, skill sets, subject matter interests, effort levels, amenability to corruption,
and worldviews or ideologies. The mixture depends on the appointments mechanism and
various selection effects.
To simplify, decision makers vary by “competence” and “ideology.”240 Competence
refers to the ability to achieve preferred goals and ideology to the goals that are preferred by
an individual decision maker. In addition, some decision makers will be intensely committed
to a particular ideology regardless of additional considerations, while others will be open to
accommodating the norms of other people or of their institutional position. To be sure, these
are simplistic definitions, and articulating the relationships among competence, ideology,
239. Much of the analysis below applies to administrative agencies as well as traditional judiciaries, and I will
speak to both. By the end of the discussion, however, institutional setting will become sufficiently important
that the argument will tend to rest on courts with appointed judges. Likewise, most of the analysis applies to
juries as well as judges, but I will refer to judges for the sake of simplicity and to maintain a sharper focus.
Juries, however, might be viewed and even defended as rough substitutes for overt merits randomization in
difficult cases that survive dispositive motions.
240. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter? Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for
Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 860, 866–67 (2008) (discussing appointments
considerations and judges’ ideology, legislative competence, and judicial competence).
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ideological intensity, and law is challenging.241 The uncontroversial thought is that
characteristics of individual decision makers vary and these characteristics can influence
how decision makers assess the merits of particular cases—especially, but not only, when
conventional legal analysis indicates decision maker discretion.242
We also know that cases differ. No institution is sufficiently specialized to face
precisely the same questions across the docket and across time. Simplifying again, cases are
“hard” or “easy.” Cases might be hard because the historical facts are contested or derive
from an unfamiliar setting, because the appropriate legal norm is unclear, because the
relevant consequences of different outcomes are hard to predict, or for another reason.243
Perhaps there is an objective sense in which the division between close calls and clear
answers can be made, a test detached from individual judgment. But there certainly is a
subjective sense in which this division exists. From their personal perspectives, decision
makers will experience varying degrees of difficulty in addressing questions posed to them.
Occasionally, the differences among decision makers will be irrelevant. A subset of
cases might be so difficult by any measure that every available decision maker would
consider them hard, or so simple that everyone would experience them as easy and reach the
same result—but the reality is different for every other issue. Less competent decision
makers will probably find a larger fraction of them hard, compared to highly competent
decision makers who might see only easy cases. Hence one group of decision makers might
be able to resolve a given case without much effort, while another group would face
extraordinary difficulty in merely understanding the choices to be made. We should expect
the error rates of these decision makers to vary, regardless of how “error” is defined.
As for ideology, its relationship to hard and easy cases is less obvious. An intense
ideological commitment might convert otherwise hard cases into easy cases. Ideology might
eliminate complexities generated by conventional legal argument or boundaries of the
decision maker’s role. For the pure ideologue, all of this can be swept away in favor of
achieving as much self-defined justice as possible. It also seems plausible, however, that
only some cases are amenable to ideological influence, either because of their character or
the character of those who become adjudicators. The answers to some fraction of questions
in the pool of cases are probably so clear under the settled norms of legal argument that no
one within the institution differs as to their correct resolution, at least after a little effort. An
241. For a productive analysis of the links between “law” and “ideology,” see Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court
Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 404, 408–17 (2007) (pointing out that preference-driven decisions can be
legally authorized through conscious delegation or inevitable vagueness, and that some judges personally prefer
to follow legal norms).
242. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 93–121 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK]; see also FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 69–93 (2007) (finding
modest effects of certain background characteristics—beyond the proxy for ideology—on judicial votes in the
federal courts of appeals).
243. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 254–58 (1986) (discussing efforts to resolve hard cases of
interpretation through fit and justification); POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 242, at 205–06

40

illustration would be a relatively specific rule, perhaps a filing deadline, that is enforced
against a party whose ideological goals otherwise align with the decision maker.
These stylized categories reflect adjudication in the real world, and it follows that
randomized case assignment influences outcomes in some sense. The random element in
matching judges to cases means that a class of disputes will be resolved differently
depending on which judge the lottery spits out. The probability of a different randomly
selected decision maker producing a different outcome depends on several factors, of course.
Extreme variances in ideology, maximum ideological intensity, modest competence levels,
vague standards in substantive law, and an otherwise challenging docket imply that
outcomes will be principally determined by case assignment. But random assignment makes
no effort to smooth out the differences, and over time, it ensures that very different decision
makers will receive very similar cases. So although measuring the influence of random
assignment depends on a comparison to another system, other assignment procedures are
unlikely to guarantee such variance because they do not so tightly link outcomes with
randomization.244
The basic point about decision maker variance is mundane to those who practice law
before courts and agencies, where judge-shopping is a real desire. Yet our understanding of
adjudicator diversity is deepening with a new wave of empirical studies.245 True, the
variables for ideology are hardly perfect and measuring competence is not an uncontroversial
task.246 But we can be quite sure that judges differ in ideology and competence, and that in
some percentage of cases the outcome will be influenced by the identity of the decision
maker. To the extent this is so, we can be sure that random case assignment drives results.
Asylum voting offers a startling example. One recent study of immigration judges in
New York City shows their asylum grant rates ranging from 90 percent all the way down to
(discussing time constraints and diverse dockets).
244. See infra Part III.C.2.c (discussing merit-based and political assignment).
245. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 272–329 (2005) (reviewing
studies). For intriguing recent efforts, see, for example, CROSS, supra note __; Adam B. Cox & Thomas J.
Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18–49 (2008); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823
(2006); David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race? 3–4 (Amer. Law & Econ. Assn.,
Working Paper No. 93, 2008), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2568&context=alea (concluding that some state trial judges
were even more likely to incarcerate African American defendants than were other judges, but finding no
statistically significant difference in sentence length across judges); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study (U. Chi. Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 404, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403. Perhaps the first study to capitalize on (orthogonally) random
case assignment is Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 812–13 (1933) (stating that sentencing judges rotated).
246. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical
Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 32 (2004) (measuring citations, published opinions, and
the “independence” of appellate judges); Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past
Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1175, 1176–92 (2005) (questioning the usefulness of these
measures).
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5 percent, and filling many gradations in between.247 Asylum voting on the federal courts of
appeals might be less disparate but is still markedly different across judges. A study of the
Ninth Circuit shows pro-asylum voting rates peaking at over 60 percent for one judge and
falling deep into single-digit percentages for several others.248 The numbers need not be so
dramatic to make the point. On far less variance, we might still charge that the adjudication
system’s actual operation is inconsistent with its loud opposition to flipping coins on the
merits—opposition that manifests itself in professional sanctions, not simply error correction
on appeal. Yet sometimes a case assignment lottery is, in effect, the method of dispute
resolution.249
2. On Minimizing the Significance of Assignment
Before moving on, however, we should entertain perspectives on which certain
consequences of assignment randomization might be ignored or minimized. One such
perspective is roughly deontological: perhaps a system that randomizes judges who are then
forbidden to randomize their merits decisions should be conceptually separated from a
system that allows its judges to flip coins in hard cases.250 The alternative perspective is
consequentialist but ex ante in orientation: perhaps the consequences of assignment
randomization should be treated like overt merits randomization, and the consequences
shrugged off from an ex ante perspective on the system.
As for the deontological perspective, it depends on the reasons why merits
randomization might be objectionable. Some plausible objections might apply only to merits
randomization and not to assignment randomization. This would provide a basis for ignoring
the randomizing effects of assignment lotteries on merits outcomes.
To be sure, some potential objections to merits randomization apply perfectly well to
assignment randomization given diversity among decision makers. If we simply value like
cases being treated alike, in the sense that the outcomes in adjudication ought to be similar,
then both merits randomization and assignment randomization are threats. If we value
predictability in adjudication, then both practices are problematic. These commitments offer
no reason for blinding ourselves to the consequences of random assignment.
But other complaints have a better chance of making the distinction. Suppose that
overt merits lotteries have a uniquely insulting quality that gives rise to a justified feeling of

247. See Alexander, supra note 212, at 22–23 (table 2).
248. See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth
Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 852 (2005) (figure 8).
249. Cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV.
295, 302 (2007) (stating that asylum results “may be determined as much or more by” the decision maker’s
identity or the court’s location as by the case facts and law).
250. I assume here that a merits randomization ban is possible, ignoring the objection that certain tiebreaking
rules in law are essentially orthogonal randomization devices. See supra notes 141–50. For ease of exposition, I
have not specified the assignment system at work in the hypothetical merits randomization regime. This should
not weaken the arguments being explored here. Note, however, that a random assignment system combined
with merits randomization would exacerbate the overuse concerns raised below. See infra Part III.C.1.
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disrespect. This complaint might be especially compelling when a judge randomizes on the
merits to avoid excessive decision costs, but it might be similarly persuasive when a judge is
simply uncertain about the correct result after an exhaustive effort. In either situation,
litigants might have a justified expectation that adjudicators will have better grounds for
affecting their lives than the dictates of chance. Furthermore, one might believe that such
lotteries violate a sound commitment to reason in merits decisions.251 The basic thought is
that officials, and perhaps especially judges, ought to have rational reasons for decisions that
influence the lives of otherwise nonconsenting persons. This preference for reasons might go
beyond reason-having to actual reason-giving, which lotteries themselves cannot do. In other
words, adjudicators might feel a moral obligation to provide adequate reasons for their
merits decisions to losing parties, in order to respect those parties as rational agents. These
commitments to respect and to reason-giving could then reinforce each other, with the
provision of more reasons averting feelings of disrespect.
At the same time, random case assignment might sidestep these objections regardless
of its influence on case outcomes. It is not clear how to elaborate this intuition, but it would
not be surprising if many people made normative distinctions between forms of
randomization in subtly different contexts. Perhaps a robust moral theory would single out
judicial dispute resolution as a place where randomization is most likely to be insulting253 or
deficient in rational explanation, and distinguish it from arguably less personal applications
such as random sampling for the census, bellwether trials, or even law enforcement auditing.
Perhaps people understand resort to chance in litigation as an inappropriate assertion of
power when law’s reasons run out. If merits randomization is qualitatively special, then the
mere influence of assignment randomization on outcomes is not enough to condemn the
system. It could be that assigning cases neither triggers an obligation of rational explanation
nor otherwise disrespects the affected litigants.254

251. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2008) (“When legal and
political officials lack sufficient reasons for their decisions, they fail to respect the rational capacities of those
subject to their authority.”) (footnote omitted); see also Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Legal
Justification, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1773, 1786 (2007) (arguing that an area of law “can be justified only by
identifying moral reasons that fully determine the results of adjudication”).
253. See, e.g., Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm’n v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648, 652, 674 (Va. 2007) (finding a
“grave and substantial” violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, in part because the judge’s coin flip in a
custody matter “denigrated the litigants whose case he decided”).
254. Compare the philosophical doctrine of double effect, which can eliminate moral culpability for the
consequences of certain actions. See, e.g., THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A
CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE (Paul A. Woodward, ed., 2001); Christopher Kaczor, Double-Effect
Reasoning From Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer, 59 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 297, 297–99 (1998) (describing an
evolution in reasoning that lifts blame from some injurious consequences of human action); Daniel P. Sulmasy,
Commentary: Double Effect—Intention Is the Solution, Not the Problem, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 26, 27–28
(2000) (distinguishing culpability for intended harms from responsibility for consequences of action in a true
dilemma); see also JOHN FINNIS, JOSEPH BOYLE, GERMAIN GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY, AND
REALISM 310 (1987) (distinguishing chosen consequences from unintended yet foreseen side effects, including
death).
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A fully specified argument along these lines might persuade some observers, but its
potential is seriously limited. The first limitation is that such distinctions will be unsatisfying
to committed consequentialists. Consequentialists cannot ignore the effect on case outcomes
simply because randomization takes place in another room, or because intent to harm was
absent. Even those attracted to “double-effect” reasoning may consider the proportionality of
good and bad consequences in evaluating the morality of a system.256
Moreover, it is quite unclear why case assignment is exempt from norms of reasonhaving or reason-giving in adjudication. An exemption would be understandable if decision
makers were fully interchangeable, but that is not our reality. Even if we assume a basic
level of ability shared by all, differences in competence and ideology will make some
adjudicators more suited to a given case than others. With so much riding on some
assignments, and with assignment systems often controlled by the same officials who will
decide the assigned cases, the demand for reasons seems no less strong in this context. The
reply cannot simply be that there are good moral reasons for randomizing assignments; there
are good moral reasons for randomizing merits decisions, as we have seen. In any event, it is
hard to discern a universal commitment to reason-giving (or even reason-having) in a system
that still occasionally relies on blackbox jury verdicts, that permits snap judgments from trial
judges on certain evidentiary questions, and that allows supreme courts unexplained
discretion over part of their dockets. There is no reason to believe that our adjudication
systems are committed to reasons at all costs, and no obvious way to categorically
distinguish assignments from merits decisions once we understand that the commitment is
qualified.
Objections based on the value of respect are equally contestable. Overtly
randomizing merits decisions can be a sign of acute rationality and respect for the parties,
rather than an insult. This depends on the manner in which lotteries are executed,257 but I see
nothing inherently disrespectful about randomizing after an appropriate level of effort on the
merits. Randomization is the mark of humility in decision making when a conscientious
adjudicator openly admits the limits of reason and, considering alternative decision rules,
explains that randomization is the rare yet appropriate response. When operationalized in
this fashion, the decision to randomize is drenched with reason. And the alternative might be
impermissible grounds for decision dressed up as convincing rationales, or the covert use of
arbitrary decision methods, or the multiplication of contestable tiebreakers.257 Of course,
randomizing a merits decision for no good reason would be disrespectful and there might be
few justified occasions for it. But no one is proposing uninhibited merits randomization. To

256. See, e.g., Sulmasy, supra note 254, at 29.
257. For a rather insulting use of orthogonal randomization to resolve a scheduling dispute between two
“bickering attorneys,” see Roger Parloff, Judge Orders Lawyers to Play Game, FORTUNE, June 7, 2006.
257. See supra Part II.A.2. It is also possible that offense from randomization expressed by litigants is feigned
or a product of unwanted outcomes.

44

the extent that merits lotteries are seldom justified, pervasive assignment randomization
begins to look that much worse in a system with decision maker diversity.
Finally, if a respectful purpose is the touchstone of propriety, reviewing the
development of random case assignment and nonrandom merits decisions may cause
concern. The story of this development might not show a public spirited purpose that could
insulate random assignment from scrutiny of its consequences.258 The system’s designers
might have been too self-interested or careless for that. Forbidding merits randomization on
public relations grounds would raise similar complications.259 Thus, deontological arguments
for ignoring the influence of random assignment on case outcomes probably have limited
value, even for deontologists.
Another way to resolve the tension can be addressed more briefly. Worries about the
consequences of random assignment are reduced if we view adjudicative institutions ex ante.
This perspective puts aside distributive concerns and focuses on the ability of people to
adjust their behavior in advance of litigation. Insofar as those subject to adjudication have
information about the panoply of decision makers, they can aggregate these data into a
composite which will inform them of overall risks and opportunities. Informed observers
will be able to predict likely outcomes and plan accordingly, even if decision makers differ
radically.261 The case assignment system will provide guidance on the probability of each
decision maker receiving responsibility for the issue of concern.
This is not to imply that there is no basis for protest when cases receive different
treatment solely because one decision maker was assigned instead of another. For many
people, the distribution of outcomes is an independent normative concern. Even if it should
not be, a case assignment procedure must be chosen. Concluding that we are uninterested in
the distributive consequences for litigants does not tell us which of all feasible assignment
rules is superior, nor can it resolve the apparent tension within the judicial position on
randomization.
Nonetheless, it is worth recounting ways in which the influence of random
assignment is already moderated. First, precedent can matter. Institutions with a commitment
to stare decisis will reduce the influence of decision maker identity when a decision deemed
relevant has already been made. Of course, the character of any such precedent could have
been influenced by random assignment. But stare decisis is not the only moderating force;
the right to appeal will also have an effect. The pattern in the United States is a right to seek
review from nonrandomly selected adjudicators.264 The preferences of these superiors will
likely influence decision making at lower levels in the hierarchy, depending on how
powerful appeal rights are in practice. Finally, the pool of potential adjudicators for any
258. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
259. See infra Part III.C.1.
261. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Judicial Transparency in an Age of Prediction, 53 VILL. L. REV. 829,
830–35 (2008) [hereinafter Samaha, Judicial Transparency].
264. See supra Part II.C.
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given controversy easily could be more diverse than it is. These officeholders are nothing
like a random sample of the adult population, and institutional boundaries indicate a measure
of decision maker specialization. Each of these forces reduces the significance of
deliberately random assignment, without eliminating it.
B. Is the System Optimally Randomizing the Merits?
Given that random case assignment will effectively randomize merits decisions with
some frequency, is this consequence welcome or unacceptable? For some observers, the
answer will be the latter. Those who lean hard against merits randomization have cause for
dismay, because most reasons for such opposition carry over to random case assignment.
Anti-randomizers might turn to abstract principles such as the rule of law, treating like cases
alike, and reasoned decision making over submission to chance.267 At least from a
consequentialist perspective, random assignment to a pool of decision makers with serious
differences threatens these principles.
To be clear, the basis for these objections is partly the differences across decision
makers, not random assignment per se. Cases might be assigned according to perceived
levels of decision-maker competence without eliminating the objection. Highly competent
decision makers sometimes differ in their ideologies, and so case assignment would still be
related to case outcomes. Thus, the above objections might prompt institutional design
changes quite apart from case assignment—such as altering the appointments process to
minimize decision-maker differences; or training, monitoring, and sanctioning decision
makers to achieve greater uniformity in judgment; or further subdividing adjudicative
institutions into more specialized tribunals; or revising substantive law toward rules rather
than standards.270 Nevertheless, assignment randomization might be especially troubling to
opponents of merits randomization. A case assignment lottery virtually guarantees that like
cases will be treated unalike over the long run, making no attempt to assign the same kinds
of cases to the same subset of semi-specialized decision makers.271
A more interesting question is how randomization enthusiasts should react to the
reality that, every day, an untold number of merits decisions are being driven by assignment
lotteries. Nothing about this fact alone should bother this group. They might be pleased by it,
seeing virtues in randomization for a limited domain of difficult merits issues. Randomizing
case assignments across a diverse set of decision makers might appear to be a substitute for
randomizing those merits decisions, and perhaps the closest thing to overt merits
randomization that proponents can hope for.272 This is more likely true if hard cases are most

267. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing equal protection and due process principles).
270. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 249, at 380–89 (regarding immigration judge quality, training,
oversight, and norms).
271. Cf. Cheng, supra note 232, at 555–56 (discussing the benefits of judicial specialization).
272. Compare John Coons’s argument of twenty years ago: “Randomness may be inevitable, but it must
express itself indirectly and even covertly at that point in the process where the human decider is selected.”
Coons, supra note 8, at 110.
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susceptible to differential treatment by different judges in the case assignment pool. Hard
cases are a class of problems that randomizers try to solve, and hard cases are where random
assignment most likely makes its mark.
But if the existing system functions as a substitute for ideal merits randomization, it
is a rough substitute. The system operates much differently from the visions of optimal
merits randomization indicated by the normative theories reviewed so far. First of all, the
existing system will not confess the absence of rationally explicable reasons for some of its
results. There are theorists who demand an acknowledgment of indeterminacy along with
resort to chance.273 In contrast, when random assignment drives results, reasons are
nevertheless provided in an attempt to justify every significant merits determination,
sometimes with certitude.
Equally important, it is the combination of a lottery plus its pool membership that
must be justified. There is no reason to believe that the actual pool of adjudicators represents
a random distribution in any pertinent sense. Current methods for selecting adjudicators are
not well designed to produce, for example, equal probabilities across feasible outcomes on
issues that remain debatable after an appropriate investment of effort. The normative theories
for randomization canvassed above seem to envision an admirable decision maker coming to
the conclusion that a lottery is the best tool available and then running it with a set of
plausible outcomes. If we try to compare this ideal randomizer to the effect of random
assignment on hard cases, there is an important gap: The set of hard cases susceptible to
influence by case assignment will be determined by the competence and ideology of a
decidedly nonrandomly chosen pool of decision makers. Objectively identifying the set of
hard cases without reference to the existing set of judges might not be possible.
Randomization works in conjunction with another variable—the pool of decision makers—
to produce merits outcomes. A simple reference to optimal merits randomization under ideal
theory is not enough.
To be fair, those willing to assess the system over more than one generation are less
likely to view it as a controversially weighted lottery. Long-term cycles in decision maker
attributes might bring the system closer to idealized merits randomization. A crude measure
of judicial ideology suggests oscillation in the federal courts over the years, even if the
courts are rarely in ideological equipoise at any one moment.276 Yet complications remain.
One is the morally controversial position that generations ought to be ignored. Some
observers will reasonably deny that benefits accruing to people like them in the distant future
is on par with benefits accruing to them in the present.277 Another question is the
273. See supra note 141.
276. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Partisan Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Over Time
28 (June 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (showing the mix of Democratic- and
Republican-nominated appointees on the federal courts of appeals by year since the 1920s).
277. Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 3, 8–9 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904) (“[B]y the law of nature, one generation is to another as one
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significance of stare decisis and other ways in which past decisions become privileged. If
these forces are influential, then the sequence of decisions will matter.
Finally, the suggested trans-generational timeframe accounts for evolving variance in
ideology, but decision makers differ in competence levels as well. Randomizing case
assignment tends to increase errors on the merits compared to a system that pays attention to
individual decision-maker skills. It means that some hard cases will be handled by the least
equipped decision maker available, and some cases that would be easy for one set of
adjudicators will be resolved by those who find them exceedingly difficult. This is nothing
like identifying a justifiable domain for randomization on the merits according to a
thoughtful normative theory. The current system tends to expand the domain of
randomization beyond what is recommended by ideal theorizing.
If there is a convincing defense for random assignment, it cannot be a quick reference
to approximating optimal merits randomization. Institutions that randomize case assignments
are working off a peculiar pool with distance from the domain for randomization that ideal
theory would recommend. Both randomization enthusiasts and randomization skeptics have
reasons to regret the current system’s apparent schizophrenia, on a first take.
C. Can the Arrangement Be Defended?
A plausible defense for something like today’s system might yet be constructed, even
if it is suboptimally randomizing merits decisions. The first stage of the defense loosens the
attraction of randomizing merits decisions in adjudication, although it is more suggestive
than conclusive. The second stage turns to case assignment. It presents educated guesses on
why such randomization became appealing to adjudicators, which might produce sympathy
for their choices. This internal view is then supplemented by an outsider argument for
random assignment. The analysis thus moves from internal management issues to focus on
the perspective of litigants as a class and society as a whole, within a particular institutional
setting.
From this broader perspective, random assignment can be defended as (1) fairly
allocating to litigants the tragically scarce and indivisible resource of judicial excellence, (2)
roughly honoring the politics of the judicial appointments process, and (3) continuing a
natural experiment on the determinants of judicial behavior. Although these social benefits
do not resolve all tension with a merits randomization ban, they do not entail a preference for
merits randomization either. The benefits follow whether or not adjudicators flip coins on the
merits. Finally, an alternative to random assignment will be compared: litigants might be
authorized to choose judges more like they choose juries. This “political” allocation option
has advantages, but probably is outperformed by random assignment in certain key respects.
More important than this specific conclusion, however, is the general point that
randomization in adjudication can be thoroughly evaluated only in relation to its larger
institutional setting.
independant nation to another.”).
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1. Forbidding Merits Randomization
In a more perfect world, we might believe merits randomization would have a
foothold in courts resolving difficult controversies. It is extremely unlikely that the
theoretically correct number of lotteries in merits adjudication is zero. Based on available
information and putting aside public relations problems, Judge Brown’s determination to
randomize one narrow and equally matched child custody argument is a better candidate for
encouragement than for rebuke.279 A firm judicial commitment against merits randomization
could instead be founded on a realistically imperfect rather than an ideal world.
The first step is to remember that adjudicators cannot rationally adhere to a flat rule
in favor of deliberate randomization on all issues. This would be catastrophic. Adjudicative
institutions would be offering all parties an equal chance of prevailing without any quality
control on the claims. Indeed, the system would encourage the proliferation of outlandish
claims following the wildest dreams of every pleader. If there is to be a relatively simple rule
in this field, it must flatly prohibit merits randomization.
The alternative is a more flexible standard. Indeed, a somewhat vague set of
recommendations for randomization’s proper domain was what Part I offered. Perhaps there
exist subclasses of cases in which randomization is plainly appropriate; perhaps this category
extends beyond land partition allotments.282 For the time being, however, it is difficult to
restate randomization’s optimal domain any more specifically than a restatement of
negligence’s perfected scope, or the exact location at which liability rules should give way to
property rules, or even when rules become worse than standards. Consider, for example,
lottery recommendations that rest on uncertainty.283 Before turning to randomization as a
tiebreaker, decision makers must be adequately certain about their uncertainty. They must be
prepared to conclude that the decision they face is not worth additional effort, or that
relevant information cannot be obtained at a tolerable cost. This is not a self-executing
instruction.
What should be compared, then, is a simple prohibition with a loose standard within
a particular institutional setting. Assuming that the choice between these two legal regimes
will not influence the composition of decision makers and holding all else equal, we can
speculate about how actual judges would conduct themselves in a hypothetical universe in
which merits randomization was open to them based on their best judgment, and compare
that picture to the situation we have now. Guesswork might be necessary, but it is the correct
inquiry.
For those lacking confidence in the relevant decision makers, supporting a meritsrandomization ban is understandable. One concern with discretion is that sloppy adjudicators
might over-rely on lotteries. Randomization’s optimal domain is challenging to specify, but
279. See supra text accompanying notes 108–16.
282. See supra text accompanying note 136.
283. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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lotteries are remarkably easy to run. For those who do not care enough about the quality of
their judgments, merits randomization is a low cost tool for docket clearing. Of course
randomizers must compose a list of outcomes on which the lottery will run, but careful
itemization need not bother a decision maker seeking convenient ways to resolve cases that
seem difficult. Without effective monitoring of judicial effort, perhaps randomization would
become too tempting in too many instances. Furthermore, it might be that government needs
at least one outfit that refuses or denies the role of chance. Adjudicators fill that role, and
perhaps they comfort the political community by assuring its members that reasoned answers
are forthcoming.286 Finally, it could well be that the justifiable domain for merits
randomization is quite small. Perhaps actual situations of indeterminacy after appropriate
effort are sufficiently rare such that wrestling with a merits randomization standard is not
worth it.2874 Better to forbid the practice and be done with it.
A randomization ban also might have desirable incentive effects apart from public
acceptance. Perhaps decision makers will work harder to achieve reasonable degrees of
certainty in challenging cases, and perhaps they will more often aspire to craft rationally
defensible outcomes. The ban might be a mechanism for constructing good judges by
envisioning a high standard for judgment and influencing judges’ self-perceptions within the
office, even if the standard is sometimes impossible to meet. This view is awkwardly
optimistic and skeptical about decision maker behavior at the same time. Plus we could
imagine judges acting with less care under a randomization ban in order to retain the
guidance of underinformed first impressions. But there is something to the aspirational view
of the ban.
Reintroducing the issue of public relations, however, complicates the matter.
Favoring sanctions for fellow judges who randomize is not an entirely autonomous
preference. Judges are concerned with negative perceptions generated by coin-flipping
colleagues.288 Public opposition to merits randomization might never abate given limited
information about judicial and administrative operations. The public seems to see
randomization by judges as a sign of arrogance, incompetence, or trivialization.289 In the
prevailing decision environment, merits randomization is likely underused and almost
certainly not overused.
In one respect, this take on public opinion is too static. A scenario in which merits
randomization can take place on anything approaching a regular basis presupposes an
environment in which the public response is not to shut down the practice. The alternative
world must be more accepting of merits randomization. Indeed, additional leniency in the
general public suggests added risk of over-use. An even deeper problem is getting merits
286. Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 92 (1986)
(noting the importance of an appearance that adjudicatory results are proper).
287. See DWORKIN, supra note 142, at 286–87 (suggesting rarity in developed systems).
288. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part II.A.1 (relying on disciplinary authorities’ perceptions of public opinion).
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randomization jump started. Were merits randomization ever formally authorized, it might
not be used. Reputation-conscious judges would probably never draw lots, if for no other
reason than the resulting public perceptions in the absence of better information about
judicial effort and good faith. Nonrandomizing judges would appear admirable compared to
their randomizing colleagues, however conscientious the latter group might be. The
equilibrium would be little or no overt merits randomization in adjudication, just as it is
today.
The conclusion here is not firm. Merits randomization offers a constructive and
honest solution for a slice of issues in challenging cases. One could conclude that
adjudicators face too much popular resistance to randomization, and that the existing ban is
pathological.291 Yet if this resistance were to dissipate, there is a risk that decision makers
would turn to merits randomization too quickly, absent a preset category of issues for which
randomization is the best response and an effective strategy for monitoring judicial effort.
Moreover, the justified occasions for randomization might well be few, and the likelihood of
judges exercising discretion to randomize is fairly low. This is enough to assess the merits
randomization ban as understandable and resilient, even if not plainly best for the long term
good.
2. Justifying Assignment Randomization
We also know that the system is effectively randomizing outcomes in a subset of
cases through the lottery element of case assignment. So there must be substantial concern
with assignment randomization as it now functions, especially if a merits randomization ban
is sound policy. A sensible evaluation of random assignment must be comparative, however,
judging it in relation to other options such as merit-based assignment and political
assignment according to party preferences. This comparison ought to take place with careful
attention to other institutional details.
a. An Internal Account
Comfort might be found in an explanation for randomization’s spread into case
assignment. Understanding the actual motivations for the system’s development might
inspire persuasive normative arguments for its retention or expansion.
The hitch is that we lack a comprehensive history of case assignment systems in
courts or agencies. Once assignment systems are seen as crucial to sound institutional
design, perhaps illuminating historical accounts will emerge. But this has yet to occur on a
large scale, and decentralized institutional design makes a comprehensive account difficult.
In this space, I can offer thoughts about the system’s development that are a bit deeper than
speculation—along with an argument for why understanding the history of case assignment
will not exhaust the relevant considerations.292
291. See supra Part II.A.2 (vetting the ban’s weaknesses).
292. The comments below will fit better with judicial case assignment than with the process in administrative
agencies, but there is overlap.
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Accounting for random assignment’s emergence in adjudicative institutions requires
reference to several other design choices. First, legislatures had to draw some jurisdictional
boundaries and then populate the resulting institutions with multiple decision makers unable
or unauthorized to hear all filed cases. Until a geographically bounded district is assigned
more than one trial judge, for example, no case assignment issue can possibly exist. Instead,
case assignment would effectively take place through a combination of jurisdictional and
structural boundaries, along with the appointments process for judges.293 True, appointed
judges in this setting might yet influence the mix of cases they receive and might find ways
of coordinating or competing with other judges. But that situation is different from typical
designs today, in which multiple judges are deliberately stationed under one institutional
roof and do not share all filed cases.294
In these settings, judges face an allocation issue. The resulting internal political
problem is easy to see, especially if the appointments process produces significant
differences across judges at any one time. Given multiple judges, growing dockets, and
delegation to a group of officials believing themselves entitled to roughly equal status,
randomization must have seemed viable against other options. A salient alternative would be
to delegate discretionary authority to a chief judge, other administrative officer, or a
committee of agents with authority to make judgments on which cases were most appropriate
for which judges. But this option would fade with any distrust and disagreement among
judges. Agents might use their assignment power to steer cases away from a disfavored class
of judges or, at the very least, to maintain an existing pecking order or division of expertise
that incoming judges might prefer to disrupt. Unease with a relatively discretionary system is
likely to have been greater in groups with serious ideological disagreements.
There are additional reasons for multi-decision maker groups to choose random
assignment over the alternatives. There might be a preference for variety and generalist
judgeships among those who found their way to the office.296 Variety will usually follow
random assignment over time, to the degree that the institution is otherwise built to capture a
diverse docket. Furthermore, a lottery system is relatively cheap to conduct. It allows for less
or no thinking about which judges should get which cases, it need not require the collection
of any information about incoming cases, and, to the extent that trading cases is restricted, it
293. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 3 (Sept. 24, 1789) (authorizing one district judge per
district).
294. See SOLOMON, supra note 9, at 33–34.
296. A selection effect from a nonrandom case assignment process makes this factor less likely to have been
influential. At the margin, one could expect a pool of people inclined toward specialization to find their way to
the bench. However, other factors were sufficiently powerful to produce the spread of random case assignment
and, once randomization becomes the norm, a self-reinforcing selection effect might take place. At the margin,
one could now expect the pool of aspiring judges to slant toward generalism. Random case assignment makes it
more difficult to attract experts dedicated to a relatively narrow subject matter, and easier to attract those who
feel that their expertise is “judging” more generally. Cf. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 242, at 165–
67 (describing the potential advantages of a federal judgeship over specialized legal careers in academia or in
practice).
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avoids those transactions as well. Finally, the judge shopping risk is worth mentioning.
Parties will have less certainty about which decision maker will be assigned to their dispute
if assignment is random rather than matched to observable decision-maker attributes. At the
extreme, and to the extent a party has power over venue, choosing the location for dispute
resolution is tantamount to selecting a particular decision maker.
These internal rationales for randomization—distrust of authority, feelings of equal
status, preference for a diverse docket, thwarting strategic behavior by litigants—have been
suggested in official299 and unofficial sources.300 They resemble the justifications for
randomization explored in Part I. But this account of the adoption of random case
assignment is, in one regard, quite narrow. Aside from a judge shopping concern, the
arguments are steeped in internal management and lack much connection with the interests
of the larger public.
This is not to say that judges have no such concern, or that they cannot perceive a
relationship between self-engineered institutional design and effects beyond judicial
personnel. It does suggest that outsiders to adjudicative institutions will not find complete
satisfaction with the case assignment system by investigating the reasons for its creation.
One must seriously wonder whether the downsides of randomization—if nothing else, the
mistakes on the merits associated with a roughly even spread of subject matter across all
decision makers—could be overcome simply by judicial convenience and the dampening of
judge shopping. For skeptics, there are alternatives to randomization and to the
complications of discretionary merits-based assignment. But even if the only feasible options
were merit assignment and random assignment, additional justifications for randomization
ought to be explored.
b. An Outsider Defense
Only so much support for the system can be built by pointing at improvements in the
lives of judges, and random assignment has costs for the rest of us. The discussion below
argues for random assignment from the perspective of outsiders. At a general level, the
argument’s structure is simple; it relies on ideas familiar from Part I. Although doubts about
the correct answer will persist, we can identify the critical issues, assumptions, and tradeoffs.
Assuming the perspective of parties to adjudication and the public at large is an
occasion for recharacterizing the issue. Those managing the workload of adjudicative
299. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 40.1 comm. cmt. (1999) (discussing equitable division of labor); United States v.
Phillips, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180 (D. Utah 1999) (offering an anti-judge shopping rationale when a
prosecutor moved for reassignment, and adding that random assignment can promote “fairness and impartiality”
and reduce “favoritism and bias”); United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) (asserting
that random assignment prevents judge shopping and ensures “an equitable distribution of the case load among
the judges of this court”).
300. See Susan Willet Bird, Note, The Assignment of Cases to Federal District Judges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 475,
475–76 & n.2 (1975) (relying partly on interviews of court personnel and citing concerns about discretionary
assignment and judge shopping).
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institutions often refer to their procedures for “assignment of cases,”301 and unsurprisingly
so. These insiders solve division of labor problems by assigning work (cases) to workers
(judges). But of course these workload allocations simultaneously assign judges to cases, and
cases are associated with litigants. Assignment systems create relationships between those
with adjudicative responsibility and those who require, or must endure, the service. When
evaluating the manner in which this relationship is formed, “judge assignment” might be a
better label than “case assignment.” The issue for institutional designers is not only how
judges prefer to get their cases, but how parties ought to get their judges.
Because adjudicative institutions are often designed such that disputants cannot share
all of the available adjudicators,303 judge assignment lotteries are facially plausible. Not
every litigant in the Southern District of New York can share the attention of all judges
assigned to that jurisdiction without serious waste. As we have seen, lotteries offer a
mechanism for sharing resources that are otherwise indivisible.304 In addition, first-in-time
rules will not solve the case allocation problem. With adverse parties to each case, the
system has to confront divergent party preferences regarding the identity of the appropriate
decision maker. Of course, auctioning judges is dangerous. Outcomes would bear an even
greater relation to party wealth and, if judges received the high bids, decision-maker
incentives would be influenced in harmful ways.305
But randomization is not the only option. Merit-based assignment is also a
possibility; the system might attempt to match adjudicator abilities with case characteristics.
This is akin to discretionary assignment procedures that were more popular with judges in
the past. A second possibility is “political” assignment. That is, judges could be assigned
with regard to aggregated party preferences and with less threat than an auction. Selection of
arbitrators often includes party preferences, if not by agreement on a particular arbitrator
then by a procedure responsive to party objections and desires.306 In a similar spirit, but in
more moderate fashion, many states now allow litigants peremptory strikes on the first judge
301. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 40.1 (1999).
303. Supreme courts and some high-ranking agency officials are an exception, and their nominally broad
oversight tends to come with a limited attention span.
304. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
305. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1179, 1220 (2007) (connecting jurisdictional expansion to fee-based judging and competition among
courts).
306. American Arbitration Association rules state that, in the absence of party agreement, the parties will
each strike and rank order potential arbitrators from a list provided by the Association. See AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-11(b) (2007),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440; Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 233 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir.
2000) (describing such a process); see also FRANK ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 185–86 (Marlin M.
Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (observing that labor-management arbitration agreements often
provide that each party will appoint their preferred arbitrator and then those panel members will agree on a
neutral chair); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Adam C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators 6–7 (University of
Michigan Law School, Olin Working Paper No. 09-001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086372
(describing National Association of Securities Dealers arbitration involving lists generated by rotation and party
preferences).
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assigned to their case.307 This makes judge selection a bit more like jury selection. Although
a political assignment system might operate in conjunction with randomization instead of
replacing it,308 political assignment would allow those directly affected by adjudication to
limit the pool of judges who might control their case.
With at least one viable competitor to lotteries, there are two remaining justifications
for assignment randomization. These justifications adhere to the judge-assignment
perspective, and they track general justifications for randomization identified above: sensible
allocation of indivisible resources across apparently equal claims, and reliable
experimentation on judicial behavior. Together with sensitivity to the judicial appointments
process, they offer a formidable argument for assignment randomization—even absent any
commitment to randomizing merits decisions.
First, random case assignment is an attractive way to distribute a scarce and
indivisible resource: decision-maker excellence. We can always demand more of it,
according to our own conceptions of excellence. Realistically, however, judges and
administrative officials will vary in competence, in ideology, and in the likelihood that either
attribute will influence their decisions. Given an irreducible degree of variance among
decision makers on the dimensions of competence and ideology, random allocation of judges
to parties and their cases is a plausible response.
The argument is simplest for ideological variance. A constellation of forces produce
an ideological composition among decision makers within a particular institution. In favor of
tolerating or even promoting ideological diversity is a list of arguments usually connected
with the appointments process. One might conclude that such diversity properly reflects
democratic forces and the changing balance over time, that it equitably distributes positions
of authority across groups in society, or that it generates healthy debate within institutions
and fosters small-scale innovations from multiple sources. Alternatively, one might simply
surrender to the inescapable reality of ideological diversity. Even if one believes that
variance should be minimized through any possible means, a degree of diversity will persist
so long as our judges are human beings.
Randomized assignment plays off of a given mix of ideology and equally distributes
the probability of receiving any single decision maker. Litigants might prefer a different
mixture of judges in the pool, but that is an argument at least equally well directed at the
appointments process, probably more so. If the mixture is acceptable, it is reasonable to
conclude that a fair way to treat the entire class of litigants is to run lotteries on judges. This
class might well reach the same conclusion if they were able to deliberate together over the
matter. Random assignment maintains any behavioral incentives flowing from the overall
ideological composition of an adjudicative institution, while offering a method for
distributing decision-maker ideology for those controversies that do find their way into the
307. See Norwood, supra note 212, at 293 & n.128.
308. Lists of potential judges or the first proposed judge could be selected by lottery.
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given dispute resolution system. Random assignment tends to follow choices concerning the
appropriate mix of decision-maker ideology, sensibly allocates those decision makers, and
refers objections to the mixture elsewhere. This reasoning is admittedly parasitic, but it
clarifies the functions of assignment randomization.
The application to variance in decision-maker competence is less apparent. We have
seen that randomization tends to make competence deficits worse than they might otherwise
be. Both merit-based and political case assignment systems at least attempt to match
decision-maker attributes with case characteristics or party preferences. Unconstrained
randomization does not.314 Furthermore, the possibility of addressing competence deficits at
a location other than case assignment (such as the creation of specialized courts, the
appointments stage, on appeal, through sanctions, or by the creation of crude rules over
open-ended standards) may not be an adequate response. One might be tempted to contend
that assignment randomization equally distributes the possibility of judicial error across all
litigants at the time of filing. In a sense this is true, although the likely error rate is bound to
differ across different types of cases. The more fundamental objection is that error rates can
be so tightly connected to how judges are assigned to cases that randomization makes the
problem worse than it ought to be.
Insofar as random judge assignment is a more palatable allocation rule for ideological
variance than for competence variance, it follows that support for randomization should
partly depend on the mix of characteristics among judges. In one circumstance, competence
will be of relatively minor concern while ideological differences persist; in a different
circumstance, diversity in competence will be the leading problem. Many factors can
influence this mix. For example, an appointments process that does not screen well for
competence or that allows for specialists to succeed, coupled with wide jurisdictional
boundaries allowing for serious differences in case type, will make random assignment more
problematic. Either the appointments process or jurisdictional boundaries can be renovated
to minimize the competence problem, but case assignment is another tool for responding to
the same issue. Ultimately, then, the social desirability of random assignment will probably
turn on the feasibility of non-assignment design choices to address low and diverse
competence issues, and the relative merits of alternative case assignment systems.
For the sake of argument, we can adopt a few assumptions that are charitable to an
anti-randomization position. First, assume that decision makers differ in competence levels
and in which cases they can resolve easily and correctly. Second, assume that the
appointments process, the removal process, the jurisdictional boundaries, and the substantive
law are fixed—either because changing these features is infeasible, or because they serve
essential functions. Third, assume that at least one other assignment system is possible, such

314. I am assuming that incompetence is not occasionally desirable as a way of checking problematic
ideological influences—that relatively less competent ideologues are not better than more competent
ideologues.
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as assignment of judges to cases based on their skill sets or political assignment involving
party preferences. Under these conditions, what is left to be said for the status quo of random
assignment over reform?
As an initial matter, adjustment for differing decision-maker skill sets is not wholly
incompatible with random assignment. A compromise could be fashioned whereby officials
judge which decision makers are best suited to which case types,315 and, to the extent that
multiple decision makers fall into a category, they could be allocated randomly. This
stratified lottery solution could work in adjudicative institutions with many decision makers
and large dockets. In those environments, the decision costs of ranking the suitability of each
available decision maker with respect to every incoming case will be prohibitive. Likewise,
the burdens of decision are more likely to leave several decision makers within broad
categories of competence. In fact, a rough and roughly stable categorization of decision
makers might ameliorate worries of abuse that come with official discretion over judge
assignment, and that motivate arguments for randomization.316
There is a broader response, however. Random assignment helps resolve the problem
of uncertainty over what makes a good decision maker. It obviates the need to build an
unavoidably controversial theory of adjudicator excellence into the case assignment stage.
Whatever qualities a good judge or administrative decision maker should have, random case
assignment will distribute those qualities roughly equally across disputants. Of course
society cannot do without normative models of good and bad decision-maker behavior. At a
minimum, such models ought to inform the appointments process and should match the
incentives for selection into the pool of potential decision makers. If, however, there is value
in adjudicative institutions controlling their assignment systems, it seems best that the
institutions avoid interjecting their own senses of excellence through a merits-based
allocation rule that they fashion and implement. Indeed, adoption of random case
assignment, where feasible, might be a way that judges retain control over case assignment
in the shadow of legislative intervention.
A final response is grounded in the value of experimentation. It is at least as broad as
any justification thus far, and it presses against compromise on random assignment, even for
the purpose of matching decision-maker skills to congenial case types. Indeed, the
experimentation justification indicates random assignment should be not only maintained but
spread further.

315. The Patent and Trademark Office is an example of intra-institution specialization. Patent applications are
assigned to specialized technology units and then to individual examiners. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 903.08 (2008).
316. Similar remarks apply to decision makers trading cases among themselves, although ideological
diversity will probably interfere with trades. Judges with very different worldviews must be less likely to trade
with each other when mutually valued outcomes are at stake. On the other hand, intensely ideological judges of
the same stripe might trade to maximize their competence with different case types. This could amplify the
influence of ideology on outcomes over the baseline of random assignment without trading.
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The basic argument is straightforward. We are still learning about the determinants of
judicial behavior, and random assignment is one of the best ways to accelerate that
learning.318 By randomly assigning a large number of cases to the pool of available decision
makers, confidence increases that each decision maker will see a roughly similar mixture of
controversies. Differences in outcomes become more easily attributable to differences in
decision makers, once observable and theoretically relevant factors are held constant. The
power of randomization in experimentation is logically similar to its usefulness in clinical
trials of new drugs.320
Of course, in the judge assignment application, the actual motivation for
randomization is hardly the development of experimental knowledge. There is no indication
that judges chose random assignment to make themselves guinea pigs or to generate
information about their behavior for outsiders. But a natural experiment can be as valuable as
a designed experiment. The resulting information about judges can be used to predict future
behavior and plan accordingly, to inform the appointments process regarding the likely
consequences of choosing one decision maker over another, and even to make suggestions
about the case assignment process itself or the jurisdictional boundaries of adjudicative
institutions.
Hence the results of empirical studies on judicial behavior provide support for
complaints about it. We become more confident about variation in decision-maker
competence and ideology when empiricists capitalize on assignment randomization to make
observations about the relationship between decision makers and outcomes. The mildly
perverse upshot is that a target of understandable complaint—random assignment in the face
of diversity among decision makers—is also one basis for testing those complaints.
Without doubt, the information made available by random assignment comes with
disadvantages and perhaps diminishing value. Some studies on judicial behavior seem to
have a flair for the obvious. Moreover, the best information on judges might never be
available to professional empiricists. Access to a lawyer who practices before the institution
in question will probably provide better insight than a coefficient indicating how clumps of
“Ds” and “Rs” tend to vote in some case category. There is some risk that the new wave of
empirical legal studies is an ill-fated fad, “a scientific enterprise that seems to return so little
from so much,” as Lon Fuller put it during an earlier surge of legal empiricism.321
Even those who maintain relatively high hopes for sophisticated empirical inquiry
into judicial behavior might not believe random assignment is necessary. Other techniques
could be adequate given what is already known and what is lost with randomization. In any
event, these empirical studies concern behavior in cases that are actually filed, and retaining
318. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 71–72 (2007) (characterizing random case assignment across judges
as a natural experiment on judicial behavior); Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV.
481, 495 (2009) (same).
320. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 39, at 132–63.
321. Lon L. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1622 (1966).
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randomization might thwart progress available through modification of assignment
systems.322 Pressing harder for randomization threatens to convert the outsider perspective
on assignment into an academic perspective that is uniquely committed to satisfying
scholarly curiosity.
There is room for debate here, and it could be that any scholar’s judgment on the
question is compromised. My view is that much is left to learn about adjudicator behavior
and that random assignment is an important foundation for progress. Scholars are still
working out which factors are truly influential in judicial decision making, the relative
strength of those factors, and how they interact with each other.323
For instance, there is little remaining doubt that the policy preferences of at least
some judges influence outcomes in at least some cases, but there is much debate over the
magnitude of that influence.324 It has to be compared to conventional legal authorities and
argument, attorney quality, strategic considerations involving nonjudicial institutions and
public opinion, parochial institutional or professional norms, and so on. As well, common
proxies for variables of interest are imperfect by definition and feed an irreducible margin of
error. In this vein, many studies use attenuated proxies, such as the identity of the appointing
president, to group judges into ideological categories.326 Few studies seem to deliver
individualized information,327 leaving us with imprecise measures of decision-maker
variation within institutions.
c. A Political Allocation Alternative
With all of this in mind, probably the strongest competitor to random assignment is a
political assignment system that incorporates litigant preferences. We have seen the
problems of a merit-based assignment system whereby officials attempt to match judge skills
with case characteristics. Official discretion can be exercised poorly, skewed by self-interest,
322. In particular, partisan balancing for decision-maker panels holds the potential for progress. This has been
suggested for the federal courts of appeals. See Tiller & Cross, supra note 9. Partisan balancing might not
devastate empirical conclusions based on the assumption of random assignment, but it would tend to reduce
their force. In any event, this suggestion is not exportable to trial courts and other institutions that assign one
decision maker to each case. Moreover, we must be convinced that panels should be constructed to minimize
ideological variance in voting, rather than to permit a wider range of outcomes for the purposes of
experimentation and debate. Furtermore, ideological variance across judges will not necessarily affect behavior
outside the courtroom differently from zero variance. Potential litigants might adjust either way.
323. See generally Samaha, Judicial Transparency, supra note 261.
324. See id.
326. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 321 (2002) (using newspaper editorials); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship
and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168
(1998) (assigning political party affiliation by reference to the nominating president); see also Robert Anderson
IV & Alexander M. Tahk, Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court, 101 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 811, 811–12 (2007) (noting common simplifying assumptions of one-dimensional policy space and binary
choices); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It? 3–
4 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 08-47), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121228 (finding problems
of under-specification, observable proxies, and unidimensional assumptions).
327. For two counter-examples in the immigration field, see supra text accompanying notes 212–13.
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and unsustainable when judges feel equally entitled to cases. Political assignment, however,
has hopes of outperforming merit-based systems on certain measures.
Political assignment in this context means that judges receive less control over which
cases they receive while litigants enjoy more. It therefore shares with random assignment the
aspiration of minimizing adjudicator discretion and its risks. A potential difference is that
political assignment might better serve the general public interest. Political assignment might
address the problem of diversity in decision-maker competence, a problem which random
assignment tends to exacerbate. It likewise creates public information about decision-maker
characteristics, albeit in a different way.
Although selfish parties presumably prefer victory regardless of adjudicator
competence, a political assignment system would be designed to equalize the influence of all
sides to a dispute on the decision maker’s identity. It should cancel out those desires for
victory while retaining the potential to steer cases toward those judges best able to handle
them. Judges who display intense ideological commitments in a given field should be less
likely to receive such cases, and, to the extent that parties cannot influence the decision
maker’s ideology, they might choose to maximize expected decision-maker efficiency as a
second-best. At least one party is likely to prefer competence to incompetence. Furthermore,
litigant migration to one judge instead of another reveals outsider perceptions about how
those judges process a particular type of case. If that information were accessible, the
aggregation of previous litigant choices would present a rough index of the ex ante
desirability of each decision maker to prospective litigants and other observers. The details
of a political assignment procedure must be resolved—such as whether to follow arbitration
models and how to allot peremptory strikes. But the general virtues of political assignment
are clear enough.
Random assignment still enjoys advantages, however, at least if we take elements of
the current adjudication system as given. First, the benefits of political assignment are more
pronounced when workload can vary across decision makers. If workload must be evenly
distributed, then a ceiling is imposed on the influence of party preferences. If workload is
allowed to vary, then the most popular and hopefully the most excellent judges are
“rewarded” with a larger docket. Some decision makers will be perfectly happy with that
result; they will appreciate the relative power and prestige. Others, we must worry, will
increase their leisure time by developing a subpar reputation and frightening litigants away
from their chambers. If we are considering political assignment for federal judges, there is
the question whether the impeachment process is adequate to temper that threat. One
immediate reaction to this complication is to compensate judges more generously for
performing more work. But the dangers of that response are also apparent: judges then have
an incentive, even beyond reputation and prestige, for maximizing jurisdiction.328

328. See Klerman, supra note 305, at 1220 (studying English history).
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Although these difficulties might not be crippling, broader questions must be
confronted. The first regards the true public value of litigant preferences for individual
decision makers. It is not clear that the most popular judges among litigants are the best
judges in the best sense of that word, or the best fit for the cases they receive. The basic
concern is not that lawyers will give poor advice to their clients about which judges to strike;
the issue is the distance between the aggregated preferences of actual litigants and the
resulting quality of law and precedent for everyone else. It is more than possible that the
interests of actual litigants are unhappily skewed compared to others influenced by law.
Perhaps one party to every dispute will exert whatever influence they have to obtain the least
legally competent and most ideological intense decision maker. This would dampen the
public value of information on judge popularity while driving down the average quality of
judging. Litigant migration, when all parties have a hand on the steering wheel, might well
systematically arrive at judicial mediocrity.329
In any event, the likely distributional outcomes of a political assignment system
should be evaluated with reference to another component of institutional design: the
appointments process for adjudicators. The proposal for reform would have to square with
the assumptions of the appointments as we know it. That process creates a shifting mix of
personnel based on decisions of the Senate, the President, and the political forces that
influence them. In fact, the appointments process cannot be separated from the postappointment assignment system. Appointment is, functionally speaking, the first step in the
process of matching decision makers to decisions. Thus matching judges to litigants is
something like The Dating Game, where matches were not only a product of player choices
but also player screening that took place pre-game and off-screen.
In this regard, random assignment tends to follow the mixture of judges produced by
the appointments process, while political assignment will probably not. In an important
sense, political assignment moves some power over the character of the federal courts from
the appointments system to lawyers and the parties who retain them. This power shift is no
objection standing alone. Rather, it is a suggestion of deep questions tightly linked to
seemingly mundane questions of institutional detail. Equally important, the impact on the
appointments process implicates the feasibility and stability of a substantially revised judge
assignment process. Members of Congress are apparently satisfied with a generally random
329. Predicting which decision-maker types are most likely to be selected depends, in part, on whether
litigants and their lawyers tend to be optimistic. Cf. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining
Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 109–12 (1997) (comparing selfserving biases to uncertainty and strategic behavior); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1501–04 (1996) (similar); see also
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2498–2504 (2004)
(suggesting effects of overconfidence, self-serving biases, and denial on plea bargaining outcomes across
different defendants). If all sides are, for some reason, optimistic about their chances for victory, then the result
might be an extremely competent though ideologically moderate decision maker in charge of their dispute. This
suggests a positive role for a cognitive bias. However, even if optimism is widespread in litigation, it likely
generates other, potentially costly consequences—such as inhibition of settlement.
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assignment system, and they could quickly become skeptical of any serious shifts to litigant
control or judicial specialization in the assignment process. A sensible judge assignment
system within the courts must be consistent with the assumptions of the “pre-game”
appointments process.330
At this point, institutional designers must face deep and complicated questions of
value and strategy. The process by which judges are matched with cases might be viewed as
a tedious and uninteresting issue of paper-pushing. The truth is that the assignment process is
an influential component in the overall system of adjudication. Random assignment and
political assignment are just two imaginable choices with two distinct sets of implications for
the system as a whole. Given debatable goals for adjudicative institutions and some
uncertainty about likely outcomes following from different assignment systems, it might be
tempting to suggest that the viable assignment options themselves be randomized. Instead, I
would return to a different tiebreaker.
Random assignment provides one of the most reliable ways to learn the determinants
of judicial behavior. That possibility for insight is already limited by a variety of
jurisdictional boundaries. Steering cases to popular judges would further restrict the natural
experiment that random assignment provides, similar to the restrictions imposed by a
discretionary merit-based assignment process. If the resulting understandings were only
useful to potential litigants and their lawyers, random assignment would be a less attractive
option. Those classes have alternative and sometimes reliable sources of information, but
their judgments about sitting judges for whom experience-based evaluations are available
will at least occasionally misfire. Moreover, even when those judgments are accurate, they
will not always line up with the informational needs of others. Perhaps most important, the
process of appointing judges operates on suppositions about how potential judges will
perform as actual judges in the future. The characteristics of the most popular judges among
parties are not what the appointments process does or should value.
This brings us to an uncomfortable reality associated with randomization as a method
of experimentation. This reality applies beyond judicial assignments and should be
accounted for however one wishes to resolve the issues of randomization in adjudication.
Randomization promises insights into how systems behave and, at their best, those insights
suggest reasons for reform. But sometimes a plausible reform turns away from
randomization and thereby eliminates one technique for continued understanding of the
system. This is not a reason for entrenching randomization. It is, instead, a recommendation
that alternative reforms be seriously considered before a reliable source of information is
discarded. For the topic at hand, the operation of adjudicative institutions, there are multiple
dimensions of design choices that can achieve similar results. We should be relatively sure

330. Analyses of assignment systems for elected judges and for administrative officials are distinct, but the
basic questions are similar. Assignment systems should be evaluated in conjunction with other design choices,
including the appointments process, as well as our goals for the institution in question.
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that those alternatives are unacceptable before rolling back random assignment and the
growing base of knowledge that it is coincidentally helping to create.
CONCLUSION
With a better understanding of how randomization functions comes a better
understanding of when it is beneficial. I have outlined overlapping justifications for the
deliberate use of statistically or orthogonally randomized processes. These justifications do
not reduce to a simple prescription. But they do provide guidance, and they help us
investigate what might appear to be an incoherent approach to randomization in adjudication.
Many adjudicative institutions have committed to randomizing their decision makers across
cases and to never randomizing merits decisions in those cases. This is, to some extent, an
ineffectual distinction. Yet the vagaries of randomization’s optimal domain make a case for
the prohibition, while the advantages in allocation and experimentation provide reasons for
encouraging randomization at the point of assignment. More could be said about these
policies. This much is enough to see that randomization is a fixture in government decision
making—even in our judiciaries—and that it can be an element of justice and innovation
rather than a surrender to fortune or fate.
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